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I. INTRODUCTION
Reiterating constitutional principles it has trumpeted since the mid1970s, the Supreme Court, in 2008, stated: "capital punishment must be
limited to those offenders who commit 'a narrow category of the most
serious crimes' and whose extreme culpability makes them 'the most
deserving of execution."" This constitutional proclamation provides
assurance that only the "worst of the worst" will suffer an execution.2
Fulfilling this promise, however, proves, at best, to be an elusive task.
More than thirty years have passed since the Supreme Court handed
down its pivotal decisions in Furman v. Georgia3 and Gregg v.
Georgia.4 Over the course of this time, courts have struggled with the
two related questions: (1) who falls within the narrow category that may
be slated for death, and (2) what characteristics constitute extreme
culpability deserving of execution. America's obstinate adherence to the
death penalty forces a confrontation with these questions as well as
demanding an on-going review of the Eighth Amendment's proscription
against cruel and unusual punishment. Yet answering these questions is
only the beginning. Intimately entangled with the resolution of these
issues is the dilemma of who decides and how the decision is made to
protect some individuals from the executioner's needle while
condemning others to its lethal force.
This article examines these issues in the context of an important
and emerging constitutional challenge to the death penalty: whether the
death penalty can be imposed on capital defendants who suffer from
severe mental illness at the time of the commission of their crimes. The
American Bar Association, the American Psychiatric Association, the
1. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641, 2650 (2008) (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543
U.S. 551, 568 (2005), (quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 319 (2002)).
2. Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2650.
3. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
4. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
5. The offenders at issue in this article are individuals who would not meet the statutory
definition of insanity so as to avoid criminal liability.
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American Psychological Association, and the National Alliance for the
Mentally Ill all endorse a death penalty exemption for the severely
Recent law review articles7 suggest that such an
mentally ill.6
exemption may even be compelled by the Supreme Court's decisions in
Roper v. Simmons8 and Atkins v. Virginia.9 However, the jurisprudence
of death and the process by which the Court makes these determinations
is complicated, contradictory, and does not lend itself to easy analysis or
solutions. A realistic assessment of how the Supreme Court may
consider the question of the Eighth Amendment's protection for severely

6. Recommendation and Report on the Death Penalty and Persons with Mental Disabilities,
30 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 668 (2006) [hereinafter ABA Recommendation and
Report]. See also Ronald J. Tabak, Executing People with Mental Disabilities: How We Can
Mitigate an Aggravating Situation, 25 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REv. 283 (2006) (discussing the thenproposed ABA recommendation, reasons for the recommendation, and examples of executions of
severely mentally ill capital offenders); Ronald J. Tabak, Overview of Task Force Proposal on
Mental Disabilityand the Death Penalty, 54 CATH. U. L. REv. 1123 (2005) (discussing background
and development of task force and recommendation to provide death penalty exemptions based on
mental illness or disability); Christopher Slobogin, Mental Disorder as an Exemption from the
Death Penalty: The ABA-1RR Task Force Recommendations, 54 CATH. U. L. REV. 1133 (2005)
(discussing recommendations and potential controversies of recommendations); John Parry, The
Death Penalty and Persons with Mental Disabilities: A Lethal Dose of Stigma, Sanism, Fear of
Violence, and Faulty PredictionsofDangerousness,29 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP.
667 (2005) (discussing the critical need filled by ABA recommendation).
7. See, e.g., Pam Wilkins, Rethinking CategoricalProhibitionson Capital Punishment, 40
U. MEM. L. REv. 423. (2009); Bruce Winick, The Supreme Court's Evolving Death Penalty
Jurisprudence: Severe Mental Illness as the Next Frontier,50 B.C. L. REv. 785 (2009) (arguing
that the Court's decisions in Atkins and Roper "set a new course" that should be extended to
mentally ill offenders); Nita Farahany, Cruel and Unequal Punishments, 86 WASH. U. L. REv. 859
(2009) (analyzing equal protection issues raised by Atkins and Roper, particularly with respect to
other mentally disabled offenders); Robert Batey, Categorical Bars to Execution: Civilizing the
Death Penalty, 45 HouS. L. REv. 1493 (2009) (arguing for extension of categorical death penalty
exemptions to include mentally ill offenders); Saby Ghoshray, Tracing the Moral Contours of the
Evolving Standards of Decency: The Supreme Court's Capital Jurisprudence Post-Roper, 45 J.
CATH. LEGAL STUDIES 561 (2007) (contending Atkins and Roper signal change in scope of Eighth
Amendment protection and arguing for inclusion of mentally ill within Eighth Amendment's
protection); Christopher Slobogin, What Atkins Could Mean for People with Mental Illness, 33
N.M. L REv. 293 (2003) (proposing an equal protection challenge particularly given the lack of
state legislation creating a death penalty exemption for mentally ill offenders); see also Bethany
Bryant, Comment, Expanding Atkins and Roper: A Diagnostic Approach to Excluding the Death
Penalty as a Punishment for Schizophrenic Offenders, 78 Miss. L.J. 905 (2009) (observing that
while Atkins and Roper indicate greater Eighth Amendment protection, the legislative record at this
time might not be adequate for the Supreme Court); Helen Shin, Note, Is the Death of the Death
Penalty Near? The Impact of Atkins and Roper on the Future of CapitalPunishmentfor Mentally
Ill Defendants, 76 FORDHAM L. REv. 465 (2007) (asserting death penalty exemption unlikely in
near future).
8. 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
9. 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
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mentally ill offenders forces an unmasking of the true workings of the
modem death penalty.
At the outset, this article briefly sets out the problem of mental
illness among capital offenders and the death row population and
reviews the characteristics of severe mental illnesses, such as
schizophrenia, that plague some individuals who are sentenced to die. In
order to contextualize the severely mentally ill offender's place within
the United States' modem death penalty structure, the article traces the
constitutional development of our current capital punishment systems.
This discussion considers how the Court crafts and justifies death
penalty exemptions, examines how state legislative action plays a pivotal
role in the development of these exemptions, and contemplates how an
exemption for the severely mentally ill fits within this line of death
penalty jurisprudence. Because of the importance of state actions in the
evolution of death penalty exemptions, the article presents current state
legislative and judicial action with respect to a death penalty exemption
for the severely mentally ill. The article then confronts the constitutional
challenges in the development of an Eighth Amendment exemption for
the severely mentally ill offender and considers ways that might prove
effective in creating an exemption, as well as the limitations of this
process and the dilemmas it creates.
II. THE IMPOSITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY ON THE SEVERELY
MENTALLY ILL

A significant number of America's condemned prisoners suffer
from serious mental illness, including reality-distorting disorders such as
schizophrenia and psychosis. Studies indicate that the number of
severely mentally ill individuals on death row awaiting execution has
risen steadily since the implementation of the modem death penalty
system in the United States.'o By some estimates, 5% to 10% of
condemned prisoners in the United States have been diagnosed with
some form of serious mental illness." Given that there are roughly 3200

10. State v. Ketterer, Ill Ohio St.3d 70, 106, 2006-Ohio-5283, 855 N.E.2d 48, 86 (Stratton,
J., concurring) (stating "[o]ver the past 30 years, the number of people on death row with mental
illness and other disabilities has steadily increased. Although precise statistics are not available, it is
estimated that five to ten percent of people on death row have a serious mental illness"); NAT'L
MENTAL HEALTH ASSN, POsITION STATEMENT 54: DEATH PENALTY & PEOPLE WITH MENTAL
ILLNESSES (2010), http://www.nmha.org/go/position-statements/54.
11. See Vidisha Barua, "Synthetic Sanity": A Way Around the Eighth Amendment?, 44 NO. 4
CRIM. L. BULL. 4 (July-Aug. 2008); Henry F. Fradella, Competing Views on the Quagmire of
Synthetically Restoring Competency to Be Executed, 41 No. 4 CRIM. L. BULL. 8 (Aug. 2005).
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to 3300 prisoners facing execution in the United States,12 these estimates
suggest that between 165 and 330 current death row prisoners suffer
from serious mental illness.' 3 Thus, whether a state can constitutionally
impose and carry out the death penalty on a severely mentally ill
offender is an issue that could affect a significant number of current and
future capital prisoners.
The phrase "mental illness" covers a wide range of conditions and
For the purpose of this discussion on establishing
disabilities.
constitutional recognition of a death penalty exemption for the severely
mentally ill, the article focuses on severe mental illnesses falling within
Axis I of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders,
Fourth Edition (DSM-IV). This limited focus, however, may be too
narrow, too simplistic, as it may fail to include capital defendants with
severe brain injuries or similar impairments that raise concerns
analogous to those individuals with an Axis I diagnosis.14 Nonetheless,
this article relies on Axis I diagnoses because that is the classification
used by the ABA in its recommendation to exclude the severely
mentally ill offender from the death penalty."
DSM-1V Axis I diagnoses include severe clinical disorders such as
schizophrenia and other psychotic disorders,' 6 which often reflect an
individual's real break with or disassociation from reality and rational
thought processes. Briefly defined, schizophrenia is "a disorder that
lasts for at least 6 months and includes at least 1 month of active-phase
symptoms (i.e., two [or more] of the following:
delusions,
hallucinations, disorganized speech, grossly disorganized or catatonic
behavior, negative symptoms)."" A psychotic disorder is a mental
disorder involving the onset of "delusions, hallucinations, disorganized

12. The NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund Statistics reports that, as of July 2009,
3279 prisoners await execution in the United States. Criminal Justice Project, Death Row U.S.A.,
(2009),
CENTER
INFORMATION
PENALTY
DEATH
www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/DRUSASummer2009. pdf. The American Civil Liberties
Union estimates that since the mid-1970s, jurisdictions in the United States have executed more
than sixty people suffering from mental retardation or mental illness. See Lyn Entzeroth, The Death
Penalty and Mental Illness, 20 AMICUS J. 41, 41 n.5 (2009) (citing Mental Illness and the Death
2010
UNION,
LIBERTIES
AM.
CIVIL
State,
the
United
in
Penalty
http://www.aclu.org/capitalmentalillness/ 10617pub20050131.html).
13. See Barua, supranote 11; Fradella, supra note 11.
14.

AM. PSYCHIATRIC Ass'N, DIAGNOSTIC & STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS,

(4th ed. 2000) at 27-37 [hereinafter "DSM-IV"].
15. See supra note 6, p. 531; infra pp. 559-60 (discussing ABA Recommendation to exclude
severely mentally ill offenders from death penalty).
16. DSM-IV, supranote 14, at 27-28.
17. Id. at 298.
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speech (e.g., frequent derailment or incoherence), or greatly
disorganized or catatonic behavior."' 8 Mental illness on this scale is
truly debilitating.
Severe mental disorders, such as schizophrenia and psychosis,
present significant death penalty concerns. Even though a person
suffering from severe mental illness may be held criminally liable for his
wrongful conduct, severe mental illness can often strip the individual of
the degree of culpability and blameworthiness that the Constitution
demands before a state can inflict the punishment of death. If, as the
Court insists,' 9 the death penalty is reserved for those whose conduct and
mental state demonstrate "extreme culpability," then how can the death
penalty be imposed on someone who, at the time of the commission of
his capital offense, suffered from delusions, hallucinations, disorganized
20
speech, grossly or greatly disorganized behavior, and/or incoherence?
Yet, to simply assume that the diminished culpability of the severely
mentally ill offender will suffice to convince the U.S. Supreme Court to
spare these individuals would ignore or at least underestimate the history
of the modem death penalty and its evolution.
III. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MODERN AMERICAN DEATH PENALTY

Although many states and the federal government have carried out
executions throughout American history and continue to do so today,
capital punishment is not practiced in all American jurisdictions, nor is it
imposed in all cases of capital murder.2 1 Even as early as the 1780s and
1790s, Americans vigorously debated the death penalty,22 and prominent
early Americans, such as Thomas Jefferson, advocated restricting the

18. Id. at 329.
19. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641, 2650 (2008); Roper v. Simmons, 543
U.S. 551, 568 (2005); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 319 (2002).
20. As noted earlier, these characteristics are some of the characteristics set out in the DSMIV Axis I diagnosis of schizophrenia and psychosis. See supra, note 14-18 and accompanying text.
21. The first state to abolish executions was Michigan in 1846; the most recent state to abolish
executions was New Mexico in 2009. There are still two inmates on death row in New Mexico;
however, the punishment is not available for future defendants. DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION
CENTER (2010), http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/ documents/FactSheet.pdf. As of early 2010,
fifteen states have abolished capital punishment. DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER (2010),
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/FactSheet.pdf. Other states have legislation pending to
See DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER (2010),
abolish the death penalty.
2
http://deathpenaltyinfo.org/recent-legislative-activity# 0 10.
22. STUART BANNER, THE DEATH PENALTY: AN AMERICAN HISTORY 88-111 (2002); John
Bessler, Revisiting Beccaria's Vision: The Enlightenment, America's Death Penalty, and the
Abolition Movement, 4 Nw. J.L. & SOC. POL'Y 195, 206-15 (2009).
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death penalty to the most serious offenses.23 In the first half of the
twentieth century, the death penalty fluctuated in its popularity and
application, rising in use particularly in the 1930s, 24 and declining during
the 1950s and 1960s. 2 5 By the late 1960s, executions had stopped,
although many states and the federal government still had the death
penalty "on the books."26 During this period, a number of observers
assumed that the death penalty in the United States would come to a
quiet end as was happening in much of Western Europe.27
A.

Furman v. Georgia and Gregg v. Georgia: The Establishment of
the Modern American Death PenaltyRegime

In 1972, as the death penalty appeared on the wane in the United
States, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Furman v. Georgia,2 8 to
consider the Eighth Amendment implications of the death penalty. A
divided Supreme Court, in an unusually concise one-paragraph per
curiam opinion, 2 9 ruled that the death penalty system that existed in

23. Banner, supra note 22. For a detailed discussion of the history of the death penalty in the
United States and the abolitionist movements and efforts in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries,
see Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 334-42 (1972) (Marshall, J. concurring).
24. Banner, supranote 22; Furman,408 U.S. at 334-42 (Marshall, J. concurring).
25.

See AGAINST THE DEATH PENALTY:

INTERNATIONAL INITIATIVES AND IMPLICATIONS

(John Yorke ed., 2009); Banner, supra note 22; LINDA CARTER & ELLEN KREITZBERG,
UNDERSTANDING

CAPITAL PUNISHMENT LAW 43-44 (2d ed. 2008); VICTOR STREIB, DEATH

PENALTY INANUTSHELL 27-41 (2008); Furman,408 U.S. at 334-42 (Marshall, J. concurring).
26. Banner, supra note 22; Carter & Kreitzberg, supra note 25, at 43-44; Streib, supra note
25, at 27-41.
27. Banner, supra note 22; Carter & Kreitzberg, supra note 25, at 43-44; Streib, supra note
25, at 27-41.
28. 408 U.S. 238 (1972). The previous year, the Court rejected a broad constitutional
challenge to the death penalty based on the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183 (1971).
29. Although Furman voided all death sentences and death penalty statutes then in effect, the
per curiam opinion is remarkably spare. The per curiam opinion is set forth in its entirety below:
Petitioner in No. 69-5003 was convicted of murder in Georgia and was sentenced to
death pursuant to Ga.Code Ann. § 26-1005 (Supp. 1971) (effective prior to July 1, 1969).
225 Ga. 253, 167 S.E.2d 628 (1969). Petitioner in No. 69-5030 was convicted of rape in
Georgia and was sentenced to death pursuant to Ga.Code Ann. § 26-1302 (Supp.1971)
(effective prior to July 1, 1969). 225 Ga. 790, 171 S.E.2d 501 (1969). Petitioner in No.
69-5031 was convicted of rape in Texas and was sentenced to death pursuant to Vernon's
Tex.Penal Code, Art. 1189 (1961). 447 S.W.2d 932 (Ct.Crim.App.1969). Certiorari was
granted limited to the following question: 'Does the imposition and carrying out of the
death penalty in (these cases) constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments?' 403 U.S. 952, 91 S. Ct. 2287, 29 L.Ed.2d 863
(1971). The Court holds that the imposition and carrying out of the death penalty in
these cases constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments. The judgment in each case is therefore reversed insofar as it
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Georgia and Texas violated the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause
of the Eighth Amendment. Each justice wrote a separate opinion setting
out his distinct views as to why the death penalty, as it existed in 1972 in
the United States, was unconstitutional or-in the case of the four
dissenters-why it was not unconstitutional.30 Although the Court did
not find that the death penalty was a per se violation of the Eighth
Amendment, the five justices making up the Furman majority concluded
that the death penalty deprived defendants of their humanity under a
random, arbitrary system" that provided capital juries with virtually
unrestricted discretion to sentence the defendant to either life or death.32
leaves undisturbed the death sentence imposed, and the cases are remanded for further
proceedings. So ordered.
Furman, 408 U.S. at 239-40.
30. Justices Douglas, Brennan, Stewart, White and Marshall wrote opinions concurring in the
judgment. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist issued dissenting
opinions. For discussion and excerpts of each justice's opinion, see RANDALL COYNE & LYN
ENTZEROTH, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT & THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 148-54 (3d ed. 2006).

31. Justice Douglas stated that it would be "'cruel and unusual' to apply the death penalty--or
any other penalty-selectively to minorities whose numbers are few, who are outcasts of society,
and who are unpopular, but whom society is willing to see suffer though it would not countenance
general application of the same penalty across the board." Furman, 408 U.S. at 244-45. Justice
Brennan observed, "The infliction of a severe punishment by the State cannot comport with human
dignity when it is nothing more than the pointless infliction of suffering. If there is a significantly
less severe punishment adequate to achieve the purposes for which the punishment is inflicted, the
punishment inflicted is unnecessary and therefore excessive." Id at 279 (citation omitted). Justice
Stewart reflected:
The penalty of death differs from all other forms of criminal punishment, not in degree
but in kind. It is unique in its total irrevocability. It is unique in its rejection of
rehabilitation of the convict as a basic purpose of criminal justice. And it is unique,
finally, in its absolute renunciation of all that is embodied in our concept of humanity.
Id. at 306. Justice White opined that although the death penalty was not per se unconstitutional,
given the infrequency with which the death penalty was being carried out in the early 1970s, the
punishment had reached or was reaching the point where "its imposition would . . . be the pointless
and needless extinction of life with only marginal contributions to any discernible social or public
purposes. A penalty with such negligible returns to the State would be patently excessive and cruel
and unusual punishment violative of the Eighth Amendment." Id. at 312-13. After providing a
detailed history of the death penalty, the constitutional development of the Eighth Amendment, and
the retributive and deterrent value of the death penalty, Justice Marshall concluded that "the death
penalty is an excessive and unnecessary punishment that violates the Eighth Amendment." Id at
358-59.
32. In describing the death penalty systems of the early 1970s, Justice Douglas stated:
[W]e deal with a system of law and ofjustice that leaves to the uncontrolled discretion of
judges or juries the determination whether defendants committing these crimes should
die or be imprisoned. Under these laws no standards govern the selection of the penalty.
People live or die, dependent on the whim of one man or of 12.
Furman, 408 U.S. at 253. Likewise, Justice Brennan commented:
[O]ur procedures in death cases, rather than resulting in the selection of 'extreme' cases
for this punishment, actually sanction an arbitrary selection. For this Court has held that
juries may, as they do, make the decision whether to impose a death sentence wholly
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Because of these defects, a majority of the Court held that the death
sentences of William Henry Furman and the other petitioners violated
the Eighth Amendment. 33
The effect of Furman was to render all death sentences across the
country void and to render all death penalty systems in place at that time
unsustainable from a constitutional standpoint. Some contemporaneous
commentators thought that Furman marked the demise of the death

unguided by standards governing that decision. In other words, our procedures are not
constructed to guard against the totally capricious selection of criminals for the
punishment of death.
Id.. at 294-95 (citation omitted). In an oft-quoted description of the death penalty system in place at
the time the Court decided Furman, Justice Stewart stated:
These death sentences are cruet and unusual in the same way that being struck by
lightning is cruel and unusual. For, of all the people convicted of rapes and murders in
1967 and 1968, many just as reprehensible as these, the petitioners are among a
capriciously selected random handful upon whom the sentence of death has in fact been
imposed. My concurring Brothers have demonstrated that, if any basis can be discerned
for the selection of these few to be sentenced to die, it is the constitutionally
impermissible basis of race. But racial discrimination has not been proved, and I put it
to one side. I simply conclude that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments cannot
tolerate the infliction of a sentence of death under legal systems that permit this unique
penalty to be so wantonly and so freakishly imposed.
Id. at 309-10 (citation and footnotes omitted). Justice White offered this view:
I can do no more than state a conclusion based on 10 years of almost daily exposure to
the facts and circumstances of hundreds and hundreds of federal and state criminal cases
involving crimes for which death is the authorized penalty. That conclusion, as I have
said, is that the death penalty is exacted with great infrequency even for the most
atrocious crimes and that there is no meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in
which it is imposed from the many cases in which it is not.
Id. at 313. Justice Marshall also observed that "capital punishment is imposed discriminatorily
against certain identifiable classes of people." Id. at 364. Supporting this conclusion, Justice
Marshall recounted:
Regarding discrimination, it has been said that '(i)t is usually the poor, the illiterate, the
underprivileged, the member of the minority group-the man who, because he is without
means, and is defended by a court-appointed attorney-who becomes society's sacrificial
lamb . . . .' Indeed, a look at the bare statistics regarding executions is enough to betray
much of the discrimination. A total of 3,859 persons have been executed since 1930, of
whom 1,751 were white and 2,066 were Negro. Of the executions, 3,334 were for
murder; 1,664 of the executed murderers were white and 1,630 were Negro; 455 persons,
including 48 whites and 405 Negroes, were executed for rape. It is immediately
apparent that Negroes were executed far more often than whites in proportion to their
percentage of the population. Studies indicate that while the higher rate of execution
among Negroes is partially due to a higher rate of crime, there is evidence of racial
discrimination. Racial or other discriminations should not be surprising.
Furman,408 U.S. at 364-65 (footnotes omitted).
33. For further discussion on William Furman and his case, see Carol Steiker, Furman v.
Georgia: Not an End, But a Beginning, in DEATH PENALTY STORIES, 94, 127 (John H. Blume &
Jordan Steiker eds., 2009).
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penalty in the United States.34 Justices Douglas and Marshall expressed
the hope that the opinion would signal the end of the death penalty in the
United States, 35 and Justice White stated that, in light of Furman, the
death penalty "for all practical purposes had run its course." 36 Evidently,
many state legislators did not share these sentiments, and at the state
level, various groups began to advocate, reshape, and craft a death
penalty system that addressed the objections expressed by the Furman
majority.37 As a result, during the early 1970s, a number of states
enacted revised death penalty laws, some of which were informed by a
provision in the Model Penal Code put forth by the American Law
Institute (ALI) during the early 1960s.
In 1976, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to examine the
constitutionality of some of these revised death penalty statutes,
selecting for review cases from five states: Georgia, 9 Florida,40 Texas,4'
Louisiana,4 2 and North Carolina.43 The Court found the death penalty
systems in Georgia," Florida, 45 and Texas" to be constitutional, but held
that the mandatory death penalty systems in Louisiana 47 and North
Carolina4 8 were unconstitutional. In its plurality opinion in Gregg v.
Georgia,49 the Court specifically found that the death penalty was not a
per se violation of the Eighth Amendment. In support of this
conclusion, the Court first noted that not only was there a long common
law history of the death penalty in the United States, but also after
34. For example, as the Washington Post "editorialized 'We trust that the death chambers will
now be dismantled."' Steiker, supranote 33, at 102.
35. Steiker, supra note 33, at 102-03.
36. Furman,408 U.S. at 313 (White, J., concurring); Steiker, supra note 33, at 103.
37. For a discussion on the political backlash to the Furman decision, see Corrina Barrett
Lain, Furman Fundamentals,82 WASH. L. REv. 1 (2007).
38. The American Law Institute has now abandoned its efforts to provide a model statute on
capital punishment. See infra p. 543.
39. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
40. Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976).
41. Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
42. Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976).
43. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
44. Gregg, 428 U.S. 153.
45. Proffitt, 428 U.S. 242.
46. Jurek, 428 U.S. 262.
47. Roberts, 428 U.S. 325.
48. Woodson, 428 U.S. 280.
49. 428 U.S. 153. Justice Stewart announced the plurality opinion in which he and Justices
Powell and Stevens found the revised death penalty statute of Georgia to be constitutional. Chief
Justice Burger and Justices White, Blackmun and Rehnquist concurred in the judgment. Justices
Brennan and Marshall dissented. See infra p. 542 (discussing Justice Stevens' recent concurring
opinion in Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520 (2008)).
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Furman, thirty-five states enacted revised death penalty statutes. Yet,
the Court insisted that history and practice alone were not sufficient to
determine if the death penalty comported with Eighth Amendment
guarantees. Rather, the Gregg Court maintained that the ultimate
question was whether the death penalty "comports with the basic
concept of human decency at the core of the [Eighth] amendment."50
While acknowledging that the death penalty is unique in its severity
and irrevocable nature, the Gregg Court nonetheless accepted the
arguments that the death penalty serves the social goals of retribution
and deterrence. With respect to retribution, the plurality observed that
while retribution may be an unappealing goal of punishment, it was not a
forbidden legal objective and it was not inconsistent with the dignity of
man." As to deterrence, the Gregg plurality found that even though the
evidence was inconclusive as to whether the death penalty deterred
future capital offenses, state legislatures were the proper governmental
bodies to resolve this complex issue.52 The Court then concluded that to
the extent that application of the death penalty in a particular case or
under certain circumstances advances the legitimate social goals of
retribution and deterrence, the Court was unwilling to say that the death
penalty constituted a per se violation of the Eighth Amendment.53
The Court next turned to the revised death penalty statutes of
Georgia, Florida, Texas, Louisiana, and North Carolina to determine
whether the processes and systems established by these state legislatures
comported with the Eighth Amendment. As discussed above, in
Furman, the justices found that unguided, uncontrolled jury discretion in
imposing the death sentence was too arbitrary, too capricious, and too
random to withstand constitutional scrutiny. Louisiana and North
Carolina responded to these constitutional concerns by creating a
mandatory death penalty system-no discretion, no problem. The Court
rejected this approach, holding that although the death penalty schemes
at issue in Furmanwere unconstitutional because they allowed too much
discretion, the mandatory death penalty systems of Louisiana and North
Carolina were unconstitutional because they permitted no discretion.54
The Court found that the Eighth Amendment required capital juries to

50. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 182.
51. Id. at 183-84.
52. Id. at 184-87. The deterrence debate continues, although the weight of evidence shows a
lack of deterrence. See John J. Donohue, III & Justin Wolfers, Estimating the Impact of the Death
Penalty on Murder, 11 AM. L. & EcoN. REV. 249 (2009).
53. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 187.
54. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 292-93; Roberts, 428 U.S. at 336.

540

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[44:529

have some discretion to impose sentences less than death in capital
cases.55 In contrast, the systems of Georgia, Florida, and Texas allowed
varying degrees of jury discretion while providing statutory guidance to
the jury as to what types of cases or what characteristics of the defendant
might warrant the death penalty.56 The Court found that a guided
decision-making process that still maintained some degree of jury
discretion did not violate the Eighth Amendment.
These cases-Furmanin 1972 and Gregg and the four companion
cases in 1976-form the constitutional basis of the modem death penalty
system in the United States. In essence, a majority of the Court has
concluded that to the extent the death penalty carries out the legitimate
goals of retribution and deterrence it is not a per se violation of the
Eighth Amendment. Further, statutes that provide juries with criteria,
like aggravating factors, to guide their sentencing decision, and allow the
jury discretion, often based on mitigating factors, to impose a sentence
less than death are generally going to be found constitutional.5 7
In the thirty-plus years since the Supreme Court sanctioned the
newest regime of death penalty statutes, American capital punishment
has remained controversial and has come under withering criticism from
both inside and outside the United States. Some of the most damning
critiques have come from past and present Supreme Court justices who
ultimately concluded that the system is hopelessly flawed. For example,
Justice Harry Blackmun, who voted to sustain the death penalty during
most of his judicial career, came to view the modem death penalty

55. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 292-93; Roberts, 428 U.S. at 336.
56. Walker v. Georgia,129 S. Ct. 453 (2008) (Stevens, J., statement on denial of certiorari)
(discussing and criticizing the current perfunctory proportionality review of Georgia Supreme Court
in death penalty cases); Bidish Sarma, Furman's Resurrection: ProportionalityReview and the
Supreme Court's Second Chance to Fulfill Furman's Promise, 2009 CARDOZO L. REv. DE Novo
238. For further discussions on the current status of the death penalty in Georgia and the extent to
which the promises of Gregg have not been kept, see Therese Michelle Day, DeathPenalty Law, 61
MERCER L. REv. 99 (2009) (providing survey of Georgia death penalty cases from 2008-2009);
Kristen Nugent, Proportionalityand ProsecutorialDiscretion: Challenges to the Constitutionality
of Georgia'sDeath PenaltyLaws andProceduresAmidst the Deficiencies of the State's Mandatory
Appellate Review Structure, 64 U. MIAMI L. REv. 175 (2009) (discussing current Georgia death
penalty system and its shortcomings).
57. In addition to the constitutionally required narrowing requirements of modem death
penalty statutes, the Supreme Court has continued to make clear that the capital defendant has the
constitutional right to present broad mitigating evidence, and the state is obligated to make sure that
the jury is able to fully consider and give effect to that evidence. See Smith v. Texas, 543 U.S. 37
(2004); Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782 (2001); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989) (overturned
on other grounds); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586
(1978).
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system as constitutionally unworkable." In his dissent from the denial
of certiorari review in Callins v. Collins,59 Justice Blackmun wrote:
Our collective conscience will remain uneasy. Twenty years have
passed since this Court declared that the death penalty must be
imposed fairly, and with reasonable consistency, or not at all, see
Furman v. Georgia, and, despite the effort of the States and courts to
devise legal formulas and procedural rules to meet this daunting
challenge, the death penalty remains fraught with arbitrariness,
discrimination, caprice, and mistake. This is not to say that the
problems with the death penalty today are identical to those that were
present 20 years ago. Rather, the problems that were pursued down
one hole with procedural rules and verbal formulas have come to the
surface somewhere else, just as virulent and pernicious as they were in
their original form. Experience has taught us that the constitutional
goal of eliminating arbitrariness and discrimination from the
administration of death, can never be achieved without compromising
an equally essential component of fundamental fairness-individualized
sentencing.60
Justice Scalia, who continues to ardently support the application of
the death penalty by state and federal governments, has expressed
tremendous frustration with the Court's death penalty jurisprudence.
Writing in Walton v. Arizona,6' Justice Scalia stated:
Pursuant to Furman, and in order "to achieve a more rational and
equitable administration of the death penalty," we require that States
"channel the sentencer's discretion by 'clear and objective standards'
that provide 'specific and detailed guidance."' In the next breath,
however, we say that "the State cannot channel the sentencer's
discretion ... to consider any relevant [mitigating] information offered
by the defendant," and that the sentencer must enjoy unconstrained
discretion to decide whether any sympathetic factors bearing on the
defendant or the crime indicate that he does not "deserve to be
sentenced to death." The latter requirement quite obviously destroys
whatever rationality and predictability the former requirement was
designed to achieve. 62

58. Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1143-44 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissent from denial of
certiorari).
59. Id.
60. Callins, 510 U.S. at 1143-44 (Blackmun, J., dissent from denial of certiorari) (citations
omitted).
61. 497 U.S. 639 (1990) (citations omitted) (overruled in part by Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S.
584 (2002)).
62. Walton, 497 U.S at 664-65.
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In stark contrast to Justice Blackmun's solution, Justice Scalia's
resolution to the constitutional inconsistencies and internal
incompatibility of the modem U.S. death penalty system is to eliminate
the constitutional requirement of discretion and the broad presentation of
mitigating evidence.
In Kansas v. Marsh," Justice Souter, in dissent, expressed concerns
about the fairness and reliability of America's death penalty system,
particularly in light of the danger of executing an innocent person. In
this regard, Justice Souter opined:
Today, a new body of fact must be accounted for in deciding what, in
practical terms, the Eighth Amendment guarantees should tolerate, for
the period starting in 1989 has seen repeated exonerations of convicts
under death sentences, in numbers never imagined before the
development of DNA tests. We cannot face up to these facts and still
hold that the guarantee of morally justifiable sentencing is hollow
enough to allow maximizing death sentences, by requiring them when
juries fail to find the worst degree of culpability: when, by a State's
own standards and a State's own characterization, the case for death is
"doubtful."
66
More recently, Justice Stevens in Baze v. Rees, said in a
concurring opinion that he had been persuaded that:

Current decisions by state legislatures, by the Congress of the United
States, and by this Court to retain the death penalty as a part of our law
are the product of habit and inattention rather than an acceptable
deliberative process that weighs the costs and risks of administering
that penalty against its identifiable benefits, and rest in part on a faulty
assumption about the retributive force of the death penalty.

63. In Woodson v. North Carolina,428 U.S. 280, 292-93(1976), and Roberts v. Louisiana,
428 U.S. 325, 336 (1976), the Court specifically found that the Eighth Amendment's evolving
standards of decency prohibit mandatory death sentences. The Woodson Court detailed the long
repudiation of the mandatory death penalty by states and the federal government finding "[t]he
consistent course charted by the state legislatures and by Congress since the middle of the past
century demonstrates that the aversion of jurors to mandatory death penalty statutes is shared by
society at large." Woodson, 428 U.S. at 295.

64.

548 U.S. 163 (2006).

65. Id. at 207-08. For a chilling account of a case where an innocent man may have very well
been executed, see David Grann, Trial by Fire, THE NEW YORKER, Sept. 7, 2009, at 42-52.
66. 128 S. Ct. 1520 (2008).
67. Id. at 1547.
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It is noteworthy that Justice Stevens was one of the three justices
who signed the plurality opinion in Gregg v. Georgia, in which the
Court sanctioned the modem death penalty system.
The inherent constitutional flaws and significant practical problems
presented in creating a workable and constitutional death penalty system
were made plain in a recent resolution by the American Law Institute.
On October 23, 2009, the ALI Council, with a few abstentions, adopted
the following resolution, which had been approved by the ALI
membership: "For reasons stated in Part V of the Council's report to the
membership, the Institute withdraws Section 210.6 of the Model Penal
Code in light of the current intractable institutional and structural
obstacles to ensuring a minimally adequate system for administering
capital punishment."69 Thus, the ALI, whose Model Penal Code formed
the intellectual framework for modem death penalty statutes, refuses to
tinker any longer with the machinery of death."
B.

Limitations on the Modern Death Penalty

Despite the misgivings of various justices and prominent American
legal organizations about the fairness and constitutional workability of
the modem death penalty, there does not appear to be a majority on the
current Supreme Court willing to find that the modem death penalty
regime is unconstitutional-at least on a whole-scale level.7' Rather
what has emerged since 1976 is the Court's creation of discrete
circumstances in which the Eighth Amendment restricts the reach of the
death penalty.
As the Court stated in Kennedy v. Louisiana,72 for the infliction of
the death penalty to fall within the parameters of constitutional
acceptability its imposition in a particular case or on a particular person
must comport with the evolving standards of decency that mark the

68. See supra note 49.
69. Message From ALI Director Lance Liebman, AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE (2009),
http://www.ali.org/ _news/10232009.htm. See Report of the Council to the Membership of the
American Law Institute on the Matter of the Death Penalty, AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE (Apr. 15,
2009), http://www.ali.org/doc/Capital%20Punishment-web.pdf.
70. See Callins, 510 U.S. at 1145 (Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (stating
"[f]rom this day forward, I shall no longer tinker with the machinery of death").
71. In contrast, Justices Marshall and Brennan concluded that the death penalty violated the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments under all circumstances and it therefore is a per se
unconstitutional form of punishment. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 229-31, 240-41 (1976)
(Brennan and Marshall, JJ., dissenting).
72. 128 S. Ct. 2641 (2008).
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progress of a maturing society73 and must "be graduated and
proportioned to [the] offense."7 4 In the majority opinion, Justice
Kennedy observed: "When the law punishes by death, it risks its own
sudden descent into brutality, transgressing the constitutional
commitment to decency and restraint."7
In keeping with this
observation, Justice Kennedy stated:
For these reasons we have explained that capital punishment must "be
limited to those offenders who commit 'a narrow category of the most
serious crimes' and whose extreme culpability makes them "the most
deserving of execution." Though the death penalty is not invariably
unconstitutional, the Court insists upon confining the instances in
which the punishment can be imposed.
Accordingly, the Court has found that there are certain groups of
individuals upon whom or certain circumstances under which the death
penalty may not be constitutionally imposed.
For example, the Supreme Court recognized in Coker v. Georgia,n
and more recently in Kennedy v. Louisiana,78 that in cases of crimes
against the individual, the death penalty is an appropriate punishment
only for the crime of capital murder.79 The Court has held that the death
penalty is not an appropriate punishment for the crime of the rapeso even

73. Id. at 2649. A century ago, the Court described the Eighth Amendment as a constitutional
device designed to restrain legislative "power [that] might be tempted to cruelty." Weems v. United
States, 217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910). The Weems Court specifically stated that the meaning of the
Eighth Amendment was not limited to punishments prohibited in England at the time of the Stuarts
and noted that "a principle, to be vital, must be capable of wider application than the mischief which
gave it birth." Weems, 217 U.S. at 373. Approximately fifty years after Weems, the Court in Trop
v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958) (footnote omitted), set out the following oft-quoted
description of the Eighth Amendment: "the words of the Eighth Amendment are not precise, and
that their scope is not static. The Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving standards
of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society." Id.
74. For early cases developing the scope and meaning of the Eighth Amendment, see Trop v.
Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, (1958), and Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
75. Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2650.
76. Id. at 2650.
77. 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
78. 128 S. Ct. 2641.
79. The Kennedy Court stated:
Our concern here is limited to crimes against individual persons. We do not address, for
example, crimes defining and punishing treason, espionage, terrorism, and drug kingpin
activity, which are offenses against the State. As it relates to crimes against individuals,
though, the death penalty should not be expanded to instances where the victim's life
was not taken.
Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2659.
80. Coker, 433 U.S. at 584.
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the horrific rape of a young child.8 ' Moreover, even when a crime
results in the death of the victim, the Court demands that the defendant
have sufficient knowledge of and participation in the murder-that is,
there must a sufficient degree of personal culpability before the State can
constitutionally punish an individual by killing him.8 2 In determining
that the Eighth Amendment imposes these limitations on the death
penalty, the Court considers the history and standards of the Eighth
Amendment and the evolution of the Eighth Amendment's protection of
the dignity of man. Moreover, the Court looks, often as a first or critical
step in its analysis, at whether state statutes provide for or prohibit the
death penalty in a particular set of circumstances. Arguably, the Court
views state statutes as providing the objective standards and norms that
create a consensus on the appropriateness of the imposition of the death
penalty in a particular type of case or on a particular person. 83
In addition to these constitutional restrictions on the death penalty,
the Court has found that there are certain groups or classes of persons on
whom the death penalty cannot be constitutionally imposed. For
example, in Atkins v. Virginia,84 the Court held that the death penalty
cannot be constitutionally imposed on someone who is mentally
retarded, although the Court left it to the states to craft the actual
standards and processes by which states determine whether a person is
mentally retarded and therefore death penalty ineligible. Likewise, in
Roper v. Simmons, 86 the Court held that the death penalty cannot be
constitutionally imposed on anyone who was under the age of eighteen

81. Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2641.
82. See Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 157-58 (1987) (holding "reckless disregard for
human life implicit in knowingly engaging in criminal activities known to carry a grave risk of
death represents a highly culpable mental state, a mental state that may be taken into account in
making a capital sentencing judgment when that conduct causes its natural, though also not
inevitable, lethal result"); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 801 (1982) (holding that imposing
death penalty on defendant who aided and abetted in robbery, which resulted in two deaths, but who
himself "did not commit and had no intention of committing or causing [the murders] does not
measurably contribute to the retributive end of ensuring that the criminal gets his just deserts. This
is the judgment of most of the legislatures that have recently addressed the matter, and we have no
reason to disagree with that judgment for purposes of construing and applying the Eighth
Amendment").
83. See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 315-18 (1989).
84. 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
85. Id. Of course crafting this criteria and process can result in some states under-protecting
those with mental retardation and allows for a fair amount of discretion and variation in how this
constitutional protection is implemented. As discussed, infra, such inconsistent applications of
Atkins' standard arguably reflects the interplay of the democratic process and the scope of
constitutional protection.
86. 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
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at the time of the commission of his capital offense. As commentators
have noted,87 these two cases provide powerful analogies to the position
and status of the severely mentally ill offender.
C.

The Development ofEighth Amendment Protectionfor Mentally
RetardedandJuvenile Offenders

The constitutional exemptions established in Roper and Atkins
tracked similar paths in their development. First, both decisions
overturned fairly recent Supreme Court precedent. In 2005, Roper
overturned Stanford v. Kentucky, a 1989 decision in which the Court
found that the Eighth Amendment did not prohibit states from executing
sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds. In 2002, Atkins overturned Penry v.
Lynaugh,89 a 1989 decision in which the Court found no constitutional
violation in executing mentally retarded offenders.
Second, prior to Atkins and Roper, a defendant's youth or mental
retardation was generally considered a mitigating factor that the
defendant could present to persuade the jury to impose a punishment less
than death. 90 However, with respect to both a defendant's status as
either a youthful or mentally retarded offender, that status could serve as
a double-edged sword. 91 Both the Supreme Court and commentators
researching the use of these potentially mitigating factors recognized
that many jurors viewed these qualities as making the defendant more
dangerous and deserving of death.92 Accordingly, there existed a danger
that jurors would misinterpret the evidence of youth or limited
intellectual capacity and use that evidence to punish the defendant in an
inappropriately excessive manner.
Third, there was strong social opposition to the execution of
juveniles and mentally retarded offenders. The ABA, professional
87. Id. See, e.g., Wilkins, supra note 7; Winick, supra note 7; Farahany, supra note 7; Batey,
supranote 7; Ghoshray, supra note 7.
88. 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
89. 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
90. Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982) (requiring state to give mitigating effect to
defendant's youth as a factor to impose sentence less than death); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302
(1989) (requiring state to give mitigating effect to a defendant's mental retardation).
91. Deborah Denno, Testing Penry and its Progeny, 22 Am. J. CRIM. L. 1, 12, n.75 (1994)
(discussing double-edge sword effect of youth and mental retardation).
92. Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 288-89 (2004) (discussing danger that mental
limitations could be used as aggravating rather than mitigating evidence); J. Richard Broughton, Off
the Rails on a Crazy Train?: The Structural Consequences of Atkins and Modern Death Penalty
Jurisprudence, 11 WIDENER L. REV. 1, 11 & n.56 (2004) (listing cases discussing double-edged
sword effect); Denno, supra note 91; Slobogin, supra note 6, at 1151 (noting that in Tennard v.
Dretke, the prosecutor advised jury that the defendant's low IQ was evidence of dangerousness).
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organizations, religious organizations, and international organizations
representing the interests of juveniles93 and the mentally disabled 94
strongly advocated for the abolition of the death penalty for these
groups. Further, the Court recognized in Atkins that "within the world

93. For example, the following amicus curiae briefs were filed in support of a constitutional
exemption for juvenile offenders: Brief for A.B.A. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent,
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2004) (No 03-633), 2004 WL 1617399; Brief for President James
Earl Carter et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 552 (2004)
(No. 03-633), 2004 WL 1636446 (amicus curiae brief of Nobel Prize winners); Brief for American
Psychological Ass'n and the Missouri Psychological Ass'n as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondent, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2004) (No. 03-633), 2004 WL 1636447; Brief for
Morton Abramowitz et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S.
551 (2004) (No. 03-633), 2004 WL 1636448 (amicus curiae brief of former American diplomats);
Brief for the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondent, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2004) (No. 03-633), 2004 WL 1636450; Brief for
the Constitution Projects as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S.
551 (2004) (No. 03-633), 2004 WL 1636451; Brief for the Coalition for Juvenile Justice as Amicus
Curiae Supporting Respondent, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2004) (No. 03-633), 2004 WL
1628522; Brief for American Medical Ass'n et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, Roper
v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2004) (No. 03-633), 2004 WL 1633549; Brief for National Legal Aid
and Defender Ass'n as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551
(2004) (No. 033-633), 2004 WL 1633550; Brief for Human Rights Committee of the Bar of
England and Wales et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551
(2004) (No. 03-633), 2004 WL 1628523; Brief for United States Conference of Catholic Bishops et
al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2004) (No. 03-633),
2004 WL 1617400; Brief for Murder Victims' Families for Reconciliation as Amici Curiae
Supporting Respondent, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2004) (No. 03-633), 2004 WL 1588549;
Brief for European Union et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, Roper v. Simmons, 543
U.S. 551 (2004) (No. 03-633), 2004 WL 1619203; Brief for Juvenile Law Center et al. as Amici
Curiae Supporting Respondent, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2004) (No. 03-633), 2004 WL
1660637.
94. In Atkins v. Virginia, the following organizations moved to file an amicus curiae brief in
support of a constitutional exemption for mentally retarded offenders: American Association on
Mental Retardation, the Arc of the United States, American Orthopsychiatric Association,
Physicians for Human Rights, American Network of Community Options and Resources, Joseph P.
Kennedy, Jr. Foundation, Judge David L. Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law, National
Association of Protection and Advocacy Systems, American Bar Association, American Civil
Liberties Union, ACLU of North Carolina, Equal Justice Initiative of Alabama, American Jewish
Committee, Commission on Social Action of Reform Judaism, Evangelical Lutheran Church in
America, Foundation for the Preservation of the Mahayana Tradition, Inc., General Board of Church
and Society and General Board of Global Ministries of the United Methodist Church, General
Synod of The United Church of Christ, Clifton Kirkpatrick, as Stated Clerk of the General
Assembly of the Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.), Masjid Malcolm Shabazz, the Mennonite Central
Committee U.S. Washington Office, Progressive Jewish Alliance, Unitarian Universalist
Association, United States Conference of Catholic Bishops (formerly known as the United States
Catholic Conference), American Psychological Association, American Psychiatric Association,
American Academy of Psychiatry and Law, former American diplomats, and the European Union.
Joint Motion of All Amici in McCarver v. North Carolina,No. 00-8727, to Have Their McCarver
Amicus Briefs Considered In This Case Supporting Petitioner, Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S 304
(2001) (No. 00-8452), 2001 WL 1682012.
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community, the imposition of the death penalty for crimes committed by
mentally retarded offenders is overwhelmingly disapproved."95 In
Roper, the Court noted that in 2005 only the United States and Somalia
had failed to ratify treaties barring the execution of juveniles, and only
seven countries-Iran, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Nigeria, the
Democratic Republic of Congo, and China-had executed a juvenile
since 1990.96
Fourth, in both Atkins and Roper, the Court found that
characteristics inherent in these groups of individuals make the death
penalty an excessive punishment when imposed on them. Specifically,
the Court found that the goals of retribution and deterrence did not
justify the imposition of the death penalty on either young offenders or
mentally retarded offenders given the offenders' lower culpability and
blameworthiness. As the Atkins Court stated:
Those mentally retarded persons who meet the law's requirements for
criminal responsibility should be tried and punished when they commit
crimes. Because of their disabilities in areas of reasoning, judgment,
and control of their impulses, however, they do not act with the level
of moral culpability that characterizes the most serious adult criminal
conduct. Moreover, their impairments can jeopardize the reliability
and fairness of capital proceedings against mentally retarded
defendants. 97
With respect to retribution, the Atkins Court said that the severity of
the punishment "necessarily depends on the culpability of the
offender."9 8 Due to the diminished intellectual abilities, as well as
diminished reasoning and impulse control of those individuals with
mental retardation, the Court found that their moral culpability is
diminished, and the goal of retribution is not advanced to the degree
demanded for the constitutional imposition of the death penalty. 99
With respect to deterrence, the Atkins Court found:
It is the same cognitive and behavioral impairments that make these
defendants less morally culpable-for example, the diminished ability to
understand and process information, to learn from experience, to
engage in logical reasoning, or to control impulses-that also make it
less likely that they can process the information of the possibility of

95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316, n.21.
Roper, 543 U.S. at 576-77.
Atkins, 536 U.S. at 306-07.
Id. at 319.
Id.
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execution as a penalty and, as a result, control their conduct based
upon that information. Nor will exempting the mentally retarded from
execution lessen the deterrent effect of the death penalty with respect
to offenders who are not mentally retarded. Such individuals are
unprotected by the exemption and will continue to face the threat of
execution. Thus, executing the mentally retarded will not measurably
further the goal of deterrence.' 00

Thus, the Court found that the execution of mentally retarded
offenders did not advance either retribution or deterrence.10'
The Court applied similar reasoning with respect to juvenile
offenders in Roper. The Roper Court relied on scientific and
sociological studies, which showed that, as a whole, persons under the
age of eighteen have an undeveloped sense of responsibility and are
more vulnerable to negative influence.10 2 Further, the Court found that
an adolescent is more malleable and subject to change than an adult. 0 3
According to the Court, these factors render the juvenile offender less

culpable and less likely to be fairly considered the worst of the worst.' 4
Relying on reasoning similar to that employed in Atkins, the Roper
Court found that the death penalty is less likely to be appropriate
retribution for the act of a juvenile offender, and the death penalty is
unlikely to deter juvenile behavior.'0 5 Therefore, like in Atkins, the
Roper Court found that the death penalty, when imposed on juveniles,
did not adequately advance the goals of retribution or deterrence to
warrant its imposition.
The importance of a capital defendant's mental state and the degree
of culpability also serve to curb the imposition of the death penalty on
individuals who play a fairly minor role in the commission of a murder.
In Enmund v. Florida,0 6 the Court looked at the culpability of an
offender who played a peripheral role in a crime resulting in a
homicide. 0 7 The Court found that the defendant's limited role in the
crime and limited culpability in the homicide were insufficient to
support a death sentence. 08 Even in Tison v. Arizona,10 9 where the

100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

Id. at 320.
Id. at 321.
Roper, 543 U.S. at 568-69.
Id at 570.
Id
Id. at 570-74.
458 U.S. 782 (1982).
Id.
Id. at 797-801.
481 U.S. 137 (1987).
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Court perversely sanctioned the death penalty on two young offenders
who did not actually commit the murders for which they were sentenced
to death, the Court nonetheless stated:
A critical facet of the individualized determination of culpability
required in capital cases is the mental state with which the defendant
commits the crime. Deeply ingrained in our legal tradition is the idea
that the more purposeful is the criminal conduct, the more serious is
the offense, and, therefore, the more severely it ought to be
punished."10
These cases suggest that culpability is the touchstone for the
Yet, the
constitutional appropriateness of the death penalty.
a
eluding
quicksilver,
like
bit
determination of culpability seems a
secure grasp. For example, how does one explain the Court's 1989
conclusion that mentally retarded and juvenile offenders have sufficient
culpability to be sentenced to death,"' while in 2002 and 2005, the
Court found that these two same groups lack sufficient culpability?ll 2
The essential characteristics of these groups did not change in that short
period of time. The culpability of the mentally disabled or youthful
offender was no different in the late 1980s than it was in the early
twenty-first century. Although the Court insists that the ultimate
question in its Eighth Amendment jurisprudence is whether the Court
finds that the penalty comports with basic standards of decency, 113 there
is a fifth, and in my view perhaps dominant, reason for the Court's
change of heart in Atkins and Roper. What really persuaded the Court to
exempt the mentally retarded offender and youthful offender is that after
1989, state by state, at a fairly steady pace, state legislatures were
restricting the death penalty so that it could not be imposed on teenagers
and mentally retarded defendants. By the time the Court decided Atkins
and Roper, at least eighteen death penalty states, many of which
previously had allowed the execution of these individuals, now banned
their executions.1 14 The Court found that these state statutory changes
provided objective evidence of a national consensus that the execution of
these individuals violates the Eighth Amendment."'

110. Id. at l56.
111. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989); Stanford,492 U.S. at 361.
112. Roper, 543 U.S. at 551; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 304.
113. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173. The Court consistently maintains that the ultimate question of
constitutionality rests with it; however, the pattern of recognition of death penalty exemption
indicates that state action is often determinative, or at the very least, a critical first step.
114. Seeinfrap.551.
115. Roper, 543 U.S. at 564-67; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 313-17.
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An examination of the Court's 1988 decision in Thompson v.
Oklahoma"'6 illustrates the Court's focus on state legislative action and
the inevitability that the Court will respond to or be limited by state
legislative actions. In Thompson, the Court found that the Eighth
Amendment forbade the execution of a fifteen-year-old Oklahoma boy
based in significant part on what states were legislatively providing." 7
The Thompson Court found:
Most state legislatures have not expressly confronted the question of
establishing a minimum age for imposition of the death penalty. In 14
States, capital punishment is not authorized at all, and in 19 others
capital punishment is authorized but no minimum age is expressly
stated in the death penalty statute. One might argue on the basis of this
body of legislation that there is no chronological age at which the
imposition of the death penalty is unconstitutional and that our current
standards of decency would still tolerate the execution of 10-year-old
children. We think it self-evident that such an argument is
unacceptable; indeed, no such argument has been advanced in this
case. If, therefore, we accept the premise that some offenders are
simply too young to be put to death, it is reasonable to put this group
of statutes to one side because they do not focus on the question of
where the chronological age line should be drawn. When we confine
our attention to the 18 States that have expressly established a
minimum age in their death-penalty statutes, we find that all of them
require that the defendant have attained at least the age of 16 at the
time of the capital offense."'
These eighteen death penalty states then provided an adequate
consensus that the imposition of the death penalty on fifteen-year-olds
violated the Eighth Amendment." 9
In contrast, in Stanford v. Kentucky,120 the Court found that fifteen
death penalty states prohibiting the imposition of the death penalty on
sixteen-year-olds and twelve death penalty states prohibiting the
imposition of the death penalty on seventeen-year-olds was not enough
to show a national consensus that the Eighth Amendment prohibited the
execution of sixteen- and seventeen-year-old offenders.121 By 2005,
eighteen death penalty states prohibited the imposition of the death

116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

487 U.S. 815 (1988).
Id.
Thompson, 487 U.S. at 826-29.
Id.at828-29.
492 U.S. 361 (1989), overruledby Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 5512 (2005).
Stanford, 492 U.S. at 370-71.
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penalty on sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds, and the Court found the
necessary consensus to recognize a death penalty exemption for juvenile
offenders.
A similar study of state statutes emerges in the context of the
imposition of the death penalty on mentally retarded offenders. In Penry
v. Lynaugh,122 the Court found that there was no national consensus
prohibiting the imposition of the death penalty on mentally retarded
offenders because only one or two states and the federal government
prohibited the execution of these offenders. At the conclusion of Justice
O'Connor's opinion for the Court in Penry, she stated, "While a national
consensus against execution of the mentally retarded may someday
emerge reflecting the 'evolving standards of decency that mark the
progress of a maturing society,' there is insufficient evidence of such a
consensus today."l 2 3 By 2002, when eighteen death penalty states
prohibited the execution of a mentally retarded offender, the balance
tipped in favor of protection.124
D.

The Processof CountingStates to Find a National Consensus on
the Meaning of the EighthAmendment

This "counting" of states to determine the scope of the Eighth
Amendment occurs in other cases. For example, in Kennedy v.
25
the Court found it important that only six states allowed
Louisiana,1
the death penalty for child rape, and only Louisiana had actually
imposed that penalty for the crime. The fact that only six states had
statutes providing the death penalty for child rape demonstrated that
there was a national consensus that the punishment was disproportionate
and that it violated evolving standards of decency.126 Likewise, in Coker
v. Georgia,2 7 the Court found that the evidence that only Georgia and
two other states allowed the death penalty for rape was critical in
showing a national consensus that the punishment was disproportionate
29
the Court found that the fact
for the crime.128 In Enmund v. Florida,1
122. 492 U.S. 302 (1989), overruledby Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
123. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S 302, 340 (1989).
124. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
125. 128 S. Ct. 2641 (2008).
126. Id. at 2653.
127. 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
128. As the Coker Court stated, "[a]s advised by recent cases, we seek guidance in history and
from the objective evidence of the country's present judgment concerning the acceptability of death
as a penalty for rape of an adult woman. At no time in the last 50 years have a majority of the
States authorized death as a punishment for rape. In 1925, 18 States, the District of Columbia, and
the Federal Government authorized capital punishment for the rape of an adult female. By 1971 just
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that only eight jurisdictions allowed capital punishment for offenders
with minor roles in the homicide at issue demonstrated that the
punishment violated evolving standards of decency. In contrast, in Tison
v. Arizona,130 the Court found that imposition of the death penalty was
constitutionally tolerable where eleven states would impose the penalty
in similar cases.
Indeed, in the Court's post-Furmancases, the Court often falls back
on state legislative action to support its Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence. Perhaps part of this course of action reflects the political
backlash the Court experienced in response to Furman."' The Court
seemed to reveal as much in Coker v. Georgia, which was issued a year
after Gregg v. Georgia. The Coker Court stated:
With their death penalty statutes for the most part invalidated, the
States were faced with the choice of enacting modified capital
punishment laws in an attempt to satisfy the requirements of Furman
or of being satisfied with life imprisonment as the ultimate punishment
for any offense. Thirty-five States immediately reinstituted the death
penalty for at least limited kinds of crime. This public judgment as to
the acceptability of capital punishment, evidenced by the immediate,
post-Furman legislative reaction in a large majority of the States,
heavily influenced the Court to sustain the death penalty for murder in
Gregg v. Georgia.132

However, the Coker Court further noted:
But if the "most marked indication of society's endorsement of the
death penalty for murder is the legislative response to Furman," it
should also be a telling datum that the public judgment with respect to
rape, as reflected in the statutes providing the punishment for that
crime, has been dramatically different. In reviving death penalty laws
to satisfy Furman'smandate, none of the States that had not previously
authorized death for rape chose to include rape among capital felonies.
Of the 16 States in which rape had been a capital offense, only three
provided the death penalty for rape of an adult woman in their revised

prior to the decision in Furman v. Georgia, that number had declined, but not substantially, to 16
States plus the Federal Government. Furman then invalidated most of the capital punishment
statutes in this country, including the rape statutes, because, among other reasons, of the manner in
which the death penalty was imposed and utilized under those laws." Id. at 593.
129. 458 U.S. 782, 792 (1982).
130. 481 U.S. 137 (1987).
131. See Roderick M. Hills, Jr., CountingStates, 32 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y. 17 (2009); Lain,
supra note 37. It is also worth keeping in mind that changes in the makeup of the Court's justices
can affect not only substantive interpretation of the law but also process determinations.
132. Coker, 433 U.S. at 593-94.
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statutes Georgia, North Carolina, and Louisiana. In the latter two
States, the death penalty was mandatory for those found guilty, and
those laws were invalidated by Woodson and Roberts. When
Louisiana and North Carolina, responding to those decisions, again
revised their capital punishment laws, they reenacted the death penalty
for murder but not for rape; none of the seven other legislatures that to
our knowledge have amended or replaced their death penalty statutes
since July 2, 1976, including four States (in addition to Louisiana and
North Carolina) that had authorized the death sentence for rape prior to
1972 and had reacted to Furman with mandatory statutes, included
rape among the crimes for which death was an authorized
punishment.'33
Thus, the counting of states and statutes appears to be intimately
tied to the protection that the Eighth Amendment affords.
In the context of protecting juvenile and mentally retarded
offenders, this number seems to be eighteen death penalty states, or
thirty combined death penalty and non-death penalty states.134 Perhaps
embarrassed by having a magic number of eighteen drive Eighth
Amendment protection, the Atkins Court insisted that it was the pattern
and trend of state exemptions that compelled its finding of constitutional
protection for mentally retarded offenders.' 3 1 It is worth noting that in
the years immediately prior to the 2002 Atkins decision, the number of
states protecting the mentally retarded offender was increasing
markedly.
With respect to juvenile offenders, the trend to craft
legislative protection was slower and less dramatic; yet, eighteen death
penalty states, or thirty combined death penalty and non-death penalty
states, protecting youthful offenders proved sufficient to garner
constitutional protection for this class of capital defendants.
E.

Eighth Amendment Protectionfor "Insane" Prisonersat the Time
ofExecution

In addition to the Atkins and Roper restrictions on the death
penalty, the Court recognizes that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the
government from executing someone determined to be "insane" at the

133. Id. at 594-95.
134. Justice Scalia has indicated that in the process of discerning death penalty exemptions for
classes of individuals, only the legislative exemptions of death penalty states should count. He
would not consider non-death penalty states in this calculation. See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S.
361, 371, n.2.
135. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 315.
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time of his execution. As the Court explained in Fordv. Wainwright,13 6
the common law prohibition on the execution of the insane existed even
before the ratification of the Eighth Amendment in 1791. With respect
to contemporary attitudes at the time of ratification, Blackstone viewed
the execution of the insane as barbaric and "inhumane."13 1 Similarly, Sir
Edward Coke, described such executions as "a miserable spectacle, both
against Law, and of extream inhumanity and cruelty, and can be no
example to others."1 3 8 Therefore, based on the "original" meaning of the
Eighth Amendment, the execution of the insane is a cruel and unusual

punishment. 13 9
Moreover, when the Court decided Ford in 1986, no state allowed
the execution of a capital defendant who was deemed insane at the time
of his execution.140 Thus, applying the legislative standards and norms
of the late twentieth century, Justice Marshall's plurality opinion in Ford
concluded that the execution of the insane, which served no deterrent or
retributive purpose,141 violated the evolving standards of decency of the
43
the Court
Eighth Amendment.14 2 In 2007, in Panetti v. Quarterman,1
reiterated that the execution of the insane is unconstitutional under the
Eighth Amendment and clarified that a state cannot execute someone
who is unable to rationally understand either the reason for or the reality
of his execution. Writing for the Panetti Court, Justice Kennedy
expressed deep concern for condemned prisoners suffering from severe
mental illnesses that produce psychosis or delusional thought patterns
that deprive the prisoner of a rational understanding of his fate or the
reason the State has imposed that fate.
IV. CURRENT CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION FOR THE SEVERELY
MENTALLY ILL OFFENDER

It appears then from this line of death penalty cases that a majority
of the Court abides a death penalty system that arguably guides juror

136. 477 U.S. 399, 407-10 (1986).
137. Id. at 406 (citing 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *24-25); Lyn Entzeroth, The
Illusion of Sanity: The Constitutionaland Moral Danger of Medicating Condemned Prisonersin
Order to Execute Them, 76 TENN. L. REV. 641, 644 (2009).
138. Ford, 477 U.S. at 407 (citing 3 E. COKE, INSTITUTES 6 (6th ed. 1680)). See Entzeroth,
supra note 137.
139. Entzeroth, supra note 137.
140. Ford,477 U.S. at 408.
141. Id at 407-08.
142. Id. at 408.
143. 551 U.S. 930 (2007).
144. Id. at 960, 962.
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discretion to find a defendant eligible for the death penalty while
allowing the capital jury sufficient discretion to give effect to mitigating
evidence that would provide for a sentence other than death.145
Nonetheless, the Court has concluded that the Eighth Amendment
precludes a state from executing someone for a crime against an
individual that does not result in death.'" Further, a state cannot execute
an individual for a crime that results in death unless the defendant either
has sufficient knowledge of or participation in the death of the victim. 147
Likewise, the government cannot execute someone who is mentally
retarded;148 the government cannot execute someone who was under the
age of eighteen at the time of the commission of the crime;149 and the
government cannot execute someone who is insane at the time of his or
her execution-that is, a person who lacks a rational understanding of
reason for the execution or the reality of it.'" 0
These exclusions, however, do not adequately protect individuals
who suffer from severe mental illness, such as schizophrenia or other
psychotic or delusional disorders, even though, as Justice Kennedy
observed in Panetti,these disorders can disable and deprive their victims
of rational thought processes and control.' 5' In reality, the "insanity"
exemption remains remarkably narrow, affording very little real
protection for the severely mentally ill. For example, when the Supreme
Court remanded Ford and Panetti for further consideration, the lower
federal courts determined that both Alvin Ford, the capital defendant in
Ford v. Wainwright, and Scott Panetti, the capital defendant in Panetti v.
Quarterman, were "sane," despite the fact that both men had welldocumented histories of debilitating mental health illness.' 52

145. But see Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520, 1547 (2008) (Stevens, J., concurring).
146. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641 (2008).
147. See Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1987); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982).
148. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
149. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005)
150. Panetti,551 U.S. 930 (2007); Ford,477 U.S. 399 (1989).
151. Panetti,551 U.S. at 960, 962.
152. In the remand of Scott Panetti's case, the federal district court concluded that:
Panetti is seriously mentally ill. He has suffered from severe mental illness, aggravated
by alcohol and substance abuse, since well before he murdered Joe and Amanda
Alvarado. He was under the influence of this severe mental illness when he killed the
Alvarados as well as when he insisted on representing himself at trial.
Panetti v. Quarterman, No. A-04-CA-042-SS, 2008 WL 2338498, at *36 (W.D.Tex. Mar. 26, 2008).
The court further stated that while there is mixed evidence on the extent of malingering behaviors,
"it is not seriously disputable that Panetti suffers from paranoid delusions of some type, and these
delusions may well have contributed to his murder of Joe and Amanda Alvarado." Id Nonetheless,
the court concluded that Panetti had a rational understanding of the causal connection between his
crime and his pending execution. The court recognized that Panetti is a mentally ill, delusional man
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Likewise, the exemption for mental retardation is generally not
applicable in cases of mental illness. In Atkins, the Court left it to the
states to devise statutes that winnow out the mentally retarded offender
from the punishment of death.'s Most states adopted standards similar
to the diagnostic criteria in the DSM-IV for mental retardation, which
sets an intelligence quotient, or IQ standard, as well as an onset age of
eighteen for an individual to meet the diagnosis of mental retardation.'15 4
An individual suffering from mental illness does not necessarily have a
low IQ, although it is certainly possible for a person to have both a low
IQ and mental illness. However, many individuals with severe mental
illness fall outside the statutory mental retardation exemptions provided
by states and the federal government.
Consequently, although the Court has construed the Eighth
Amendment to protect from execution teenagers, mentally retarded
offenders, and persons deemed "insane" at the time of their execution,
the Eighth Amendment currently does not protect all or even a
substantial majority of severely mentally ill capital defendants. Yet,
such severely mentally ill prisoners, those suffering from psychosis or
schizophrenia, possess many of the same attributes, including
diminished culpability and blameworthiness, as others who have been

and that Panetti "was mentally ill when he committed his crime and continues to be mentally ill
today." Id at *37. Still, the district court determined that Panetti "has both a factual and rational
understanding of his crime, his impending death, and the causal retributive connection between the
two. Therefore, if any mentally ill person is competent to be executed for his crimes, this record
establishes it is Scott Panetti." Id.
153. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 317.
154. The DSM-IV diagnostic criteria for mental retardation is set out below:
A. Significantly subaverage intellectual functioning: an IQ of approximately 70 or
below on an individually administered IQ test (for infants, a clinical judgment of
significantly subaverage intellectual functioning).
B. Concurrent deficits or impairments in present adaptive functioning (i.e., the person's
effectiveness in meeting the standards expected for his or her age by his or her cultural
group) in at least two of the following areas: communication, self-care, home living,
social/interpersonal skills, use of community resources, self-direction, functional
academic skills, work, leisure, health, and safety.
C. The onset is before 18 years.
DSM-IV, supra note 14, at 319. For examples of state statutes exempting the mentally retarded
offender from the death penalty and establishing criteria for that determination, see e.g. ARIz. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 13-753 (2010); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-618 (2010); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1376 (2010);
COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-1102 (2010); FLA. STAT. § 921.137 (2010); IDAHO CODE ANN. §
19-2515A (2010); 725 ILL. COM. STAT. ANN. § 5/114-1 (2010); IND. CODE §§ 35-36-9-2 (2010), 3536-9-6 (2010); KY. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 532.130 (2010), 532.140 (2010); NEB. REV. STAT. §
28-105.01 (2010); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2005 (2010); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 701.10b (2010);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-203 (2010); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-207 (LexisNexis 2010); VA. CODE
ANN. § 19.2-264.3:1.1 (2010).
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exempted from the death penalty. 5 For example, schizophrenia is
defined by the National Institute of Mental Health as "a chronic, severe,
Individuals diagnosed with
and disabling brain disorder."' 5 6
schizophrenia suffer from hallucinations, delusions, thought disorders,
movement disorders, with hearing voices being the most common
hallucination.' 57 Moreover, cognitive symptoms that can accompany
this disability include a "poor . .. ability to understand information and
use it to make decisions," "[t]rouble focusing or paying attention," and
"[p]roblems with .

.

. the ability to use information immediately after

learning it.""' Often individuals with schizophrenia display a lack of
understanding of the consequence of their actions, particularly when the
individual suffers from delusions or hallucinations,15 9 and a lack or
limited control of impulses, which can arise from the limits the illness
imposes on the individual's ability to process and use information or to
control behavior, particularly behavior resulting from delusions caused
by their mental illness.16 0 These attributes are not unlike the limited
judgment, reasoning and impulse control of mentally retarded and
juvenile offenders. Moreover, these qualities provide strong evidence of
diminished culpability or blameworthiness, which should place those
who suffer these illnesses outside the category of the worst of the worst.
Further, the defendant who suffers from severe mental illness may
be at greater risk of an unfair trial or inadequate defense. For example, a
jury may very well view the defendant's mental illness as an aggravating
factor, which could increase the risk that a jury would impose an
excessive or inappropriate sentence.16 1 Likewise, a defendant who
suffers from severe mental illness may lack or have a limited ability to
assist in his defense, make rational legal decisions, or adequately advise
his lawyer about meaningful defenses.1 62 Particularly during the capital
sentencing phase of trial, a severely mentally ill defendant may be
unable to meaningfully assist his lawyer in developing and presenting

155. For a discussion on potential equal protection challenges for severely mental ill offenders,
see Farahany, supranote 7; Slobogin, supra note 7.
156. NAT'L MENTAL HEALTH ASS'N, Death Penalty & People with Mental Illnesses (2006),
http://www.nimh.nih.gov/health/publications/schizophrenia/complete-index.shtml.
157. Id.
158. Id
159. Id.
160. Id
161. See, e.g., Unjust Death Penalty, THE JOURNAL GAZETTE, Jan. 6, 2009, available at
6
http://www.journalgazette.net/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20090106/EDITO7/9010 0316.
his
capital trial, see
effect
on
and
its
mental
illness
Panetti's
of
Scott
discussion
Id.
For
a
162.
Panetti v. Quarterman, No. A-04-CA-042-SS, 2008 WL 2338498 (W.D.Tex. Mar. 26, 2008).
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mitigating evidence to the jury. These same concerns also plagued the
sentencing process of juvenile and mentally retarded offenders.
An additional concern surfaces when the state seeks to execute the
severely mentally ill. As discussed earlier, Ford and Panetti give
constitutional effect to the long-standing common law prohibition of the
execution of the insane. This exemption, however, raises the specter of
the government forcibly medicating the condemned prisoner with antipsychotic drugs to render the "insane" capital defendant "sane" enough
to execute. Because anti-psychotic drugs exist to treat mental illness
such as schizophrenia, a defendant, who otherwise is exempt from
execution under Ford and Panetti,may be forced to take medication for
the sole purpose of rendering him ready for execution.16 ' Further adding
to the moral dilemmas created by this macabre situation, a capital
defendant may actually forgo medically appropriate and humane
treatment for his mental illness to avoid execution. *
As some commentators have observed, 65 the parallels between the
severely mentally ill and the individuals protected by Atkins and Roper
Like juvenile offenders and mentally retarded
are remarkable.
offenders, the severely mentally ill often lack or have diminished
impulse control and have difficulty comprehending the consequences of
their actions. These limitations are due to the mental illness, particularly
when that mental illness includes hallucinations or other delusions or
thought distortions. Like in Roper and Atkins, these characteristics
diminish both the blameworthiness of the severely mentally ill offender
and reduce the deterrence effect of the death penalty. Also, like youth
and mental retardation, while mental illness should be treated as a
mitigating factor, it could easily be viewed as an aggravating factor
instead.
In response to these concerns, the ABA House of Delegates, in
August of 2006, adopted a recommendation barring the imposition of the
death penalty on persons with mental disabilities, including severe
mental illness.'66 The American Psychiatric Association, the American
Psychological Association, and the National Alliance for the Mentally Ill
also endorse this death penalty exemption.167 In accord with these
163. Entzeroth, supranote 137.
164. Id.
165. Winick, supra note 7; Farahany, supra note 7; Batey, supranote 7; see also Bryant, supra
note 7; Shin, supranote 7.
166. ABA Recommendation and Report, supra note 6. See also Richard J. Bonnie, Panetti v.
Quarterman:Mental Illness, the Death Penalty, and Human Dignity, 5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 257
(2007); Parry, supranote 6.
167. ABA Recommendation and Report, supra note 6
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views, the United Nations Commission on Human Rights also seeks an
end to the imposition of the death penalty on individuals suffering from
Thus, as with juvenile and mentally retarded
mental illness.'68
offenders, leading national and international organizations support a
death penalty exemption for the severely mentally ill.
In the second paragraph, the ABA recommendation advises:
Defendants should not be executed or sentenced to death if, at the time
of the offense, they had a severe mental disorder or disability that
significantly impaired their capacity (a) to appreciate the nature,
consequences or wrongfulness of their conduct, (b) to exercise rational
judgment in relation to conduct, or (c) to conform their conduct to the
requirements of the law. A disorder manifested primarily by repeated
criminal conduct or attributable solely to the acute effects of voluntary
use of alcohol or other drugs does not, standing alone, constitute a
mental disorder or disability for purposes of this provision. 69
According to the ABA Recommendation and Report, this
recommendation would "prohibit execution of persons with severe
mental disabilities whose demonstrated impairments of mental and
emotional functioning at the time of the offense would render a death
sentence disproportionate to their culpability."17 0
The ABA
recommendation focuses on limiting the application of the death penalty
to persons who possess a sufficient degree of blameworthiness for a
constitutionally proportional imposition of the death penalty"' and is
meant to apply the principles of Atkins v. Virginia 72 and Roper v.
Simmons 7 3 to persons with severe mental illness, particularly persons
suffering from DSM-IV-Tr. Axis I diagnoses, including schizophrenia
and psychotic disorders.1 7 4
Of course, an ABA recommendation is a far cry from a Supreme
Court pronouncement banning the execution of the severely mentally
168. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL USA, Death Penalty and Mental Illness (2010),
http://www.amnestyusa.org/death-penalty/death-penalty-facts/death-penalty-and-mentalillness/page.do?id=l 101090; Comm'n on Human Rights Res. 2003/67, The question of the death
penalty, 58th Sess., Apr. 24, 2003, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/2003/67 (found in Compendium of
United Nations standards and norms in crime prevention and criminaljustice, subsection 23,
available at http://www.unodc.org/pdf/compendiun/compendium_2006jart _05.pdf); Comm'n
on Human Rights Res. 2000/65, The question of the death penalty, 55th Sess., Apr. 26, 2000, U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4/RES/2000/65; Entzeroth, supra note 12.
169. ABA Recommendation and Report, supra note 6, at 668.
170. Id. at 670.
171. Id.
172. 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (prohibiting execution of mentally retarded).
173. 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (prohibiting execution ofjuveniles).
174. ABA Recommendation and Report, supra note 6, at 670.
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ill.'
As noted earlier, several commentators have suggested that the
decisions of Roper and Atkins compel a constitutional exemption for the
severely mentally ill. 17 6 Moreover, the unique characteristics of the
mentally ill offender, the historic constitutional and common law
exemption for "insane" offenders, and the risks of forced medication to
render the mentally ill fit for execution present perhaps even stronger
arguments that evolving standards of decency include protection of this
group of individuals. Yet, this observation is only part of the equation.
Still remaining are the crucial questions of what state legislatures are
doing on this issue and what effect state legislative action will have or
should have in making a constitutional exemption for the severely
mentally ill a reality.
V. BRINGING THE DEATH PENALTY EXEMPTION FOR THE SEVERELY
MENTALLY ILL TO REALITY

As compelling as the analogies between the mentally ill offender
and the offenders at issue in Atkins and Roper are, and as troubling and
morally fraught as the execution of mentally ill defendants is, the
Court's record on crafting death penalty exemptions unfortunately
suggests a continued tough road ahead. Looking at Atkins and Roper,
the tipping point in these cases was the fact that eighteen death penalty
states, plus the then-twelve non-death penalty states, prohibited the
execution of juvenile and mentally retarded offenders. It was the
legislative actions of the states that compelled the Court to conclude that
there was a national consensus to ban the execution of mentally retarded
and juvenile offenders.177

175. Indeed, in another context, Justice Alito has indicated how the Court might limit the
impact of an ABA recommendation. See Bobby v. Van Hook, 130 S. Ct. 13, 20 (2009) (Alito, J.,
concurring). In discussing ABA standards for counsel in capital mitigation investigation and the
bearing of those standards in reviewing the constitutionality of counsel's performance, Justice Alito
said:
The ABA is a venerable organization with a history of service to the bar, but it is, after
all, a private group with limited membership. The views of the association's members,
not to mention the views of the members of the advisory committee that formulated the
2003 Guidelines, do not necessarily reflect the views of the American bar as a whole. It
is the responsibility of the courts to determine the nature of the work that a defense
attorney must do in a capital case in order to meet the obligations imposed by the
Constitution, and I see no reason why the ABA Guidelines should be given a privileged
position in making that determination.
Id.
176. Winick, supranote 7; Farahany, supranote 7; Batey, supra note 7.
177. But see Batey, supra note 7, at 1525-27 (2009) (arguing that legislative consensus may not
be necessary in light of Atkins and Panetti); Winick, supra note 7.

562

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[44:529

More recently, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether
the Eighth Amendment erects a categorical prohibition on imposing life
without parole on juveniles who commit non-homicide offenses,
including juveniles as young as thirteen."' 8 During oral arguments in
Sullivan v. Florida and Graham v. Florida,the justices asked a number
of questions about how many states allowed such sentences and how
many states imposed such sentences.' 79 In deciding that the Eighth
Amendment prohibits the imposition of a sentence without the
possibility of parole, the Court considered state legislative action a
critical component of its analysis.'so As it has indicated in cases such as
Atkins and Roper, the Graham Court stated that the starting point for its
Eighth Amendment analysis is objective evidence of national consensus,
and " '[t]he "clearest and most reliable objective evidence of
contemporary values is the legislation enacted by the country's
legislatures." ' "8'

The Court's approach to construing the meaning of the Eighth
Amendment suggests strongly that, in crafting a death penalty exemption
for the severely mentally ill, one must consider and take into account the
process by which the Court crafts its exemption as well as the
substantive merits of the case. If "counting" is a process that matters to
the Court,' 82 then we need to count. As of February 2010, fifteen states
prohibited the death penalty in all circumstances; therefore, since Roper
and Atkins, there have been three additional states that prohibit
executions.' 83 In 2003, then-Illinois Governor George Ryan commuted
all death sentences in his state, and for a period of time there was a
moratorium on the death penalty in Illinois.'" Maryland, which had a
commission study its system of capital punishment,'" recently enacted
178. See Transcript of Oral Argument, Sullivan v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2059 (2009) (No. 087621); Transcript of Oral Argument, Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010) (No. 08-7412).
179. Transcript of Oral Argument at 3, 14-16, 20-23, 25-32, 49-50, Sullivan v. Florida, 130 S.
Ct. 2059 (2009) (No. 08-7621); Transcript of Oral Argument at 3-4, 23, 26-27, 343-35, 42, Graham
v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010) (No. 08-7412).
180. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010).
181. Id. at 2023 (quoting Atkins, 536 U.S. at 312).
182. See Hills, Jr., supra, note 131.
183. New Jersey, New Mexico and New York are the most recent states to abolish the death
(2010),
CENTER
INFORMATION
PENALTY
DEATH
penalty.
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/FactSheet.pdf
184. See Jodi Wilgoren, Citing Issues of Fairness,Governor Empties Illinois Death Row, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 12, 2003).
185. See MARYLAND COMMISSION ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT,
2008),
(Md.
ASSEMBLY
GENERAL

http://www.goccp.maryland.gov/capital-punishment/documents/
death-penalty-commission-final-report.pdf.

FINAL REPORT TO THE
at
available

563

THE CHALLENGE AND DILEMMA

2011]

significant restrictions on the imposition of the death penalty.
Legislation is pending in several states to abolish the death penalty. 87
Other states, such as New Hampshire, California, Tennessee, Nevada,
and North Carolina, have created commissions to study the death
penalty.'8 8 Thus, countering a more than thirty-year trend of expanding
and embracing capital punishment, states are moving away from or
imposing greater restrictions on the use of the death penalty.
As to exemptions for mentally ill offenders, all death penalty states
forbid the execution of someone who is deemed "insane" at the time of
his execution. 89
As discussed earlier, these exemptions are
constitutionally required and also trace their origin to a common law
prohibition on such executions that existed at the time of the ratification
of the Eighth Amendment. Although these exemptions do not cover
most severely mentally ill prisoners, the prohibition indicates the longstanding societal revulsion at executing a severely mentally disabled
individual. However, these exemptions do not correlate with the
defendant's mental illness and culpability at the time of the commission
of his crime; rather, the exemptions concern the offender's mental health
at the time of execution.

186. MD. CODE ANN. CRIM. LAW, § 2-202. It is interesting that, in an effort to ensure greater
accuracy and fewer wrongful convictions, Maryland Code, Criminal Law, § 2-202, requires "the
State presents the court or jury with (i) biological evidence or DNA evidence that links the
defendant to the act of murder; (ii) a video taped, voluntary interrogation and confession of the
defendant to the murder; or (iii) a video recording that conclusively links the defendant to the
murder." Also § 202(c), provides: "A defendant may not be sentenced to death, but shall be
sentenced to imprisonment for life without the possibility of parole subject to the requirements of §
2-203(1) of this subtitle or imprisonment for life, if the State relies solely on evidence provided by
eyewitnesses."
187. See DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER (2010), http://deathpenaltyinfo.org/recentlegislative-activity#20 10. According to the Death Penalty Information Center, legislation is
pending to abolish the death in Kentucky, Nebraska, South Dakota, and Washington. On February
19, 2010, a bill to abolish the death penalty in Kansas lost by a tie vote, 20-20, in the state senate.
DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER (2010), http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/.
188. See S. Res. 44, 2003-04 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2004) (establishing California Commission
of Fair Administration of Justice to study death penalty in California); A.C.R. 3, 71st Leg., 17th
Spec. Sess. (Nev. 2001) (authorizing legislative commission to study death penalty); H.B. 520, 2009
Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.H. 2009) (establishing a commission to study death penalty in New Hampshire);
H.B. 163, 1999 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 1999) (enacted) (assigning to Legislative Research
Commission task of looking at imposition of death penalty on mentally retarded offenders and
prohibiting death penalty obtained on basis of race); S.B. 1911, 105th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess.
(Tenn. 2007) (enacted) (creating a committee to study administration of death penalty). See also
DEATH

PENALTY

INFORMATION

CENTER

(2010),

http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/recent-legislative-activity.
189. See Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930 (2007); Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399
(1986).
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To date, Connecticut is the only death penalty state that explicitly
bans the execution of someone who is mentally ill at the time of the
commission of the offense. The Connecticut statute on point provides:
The court shall not impose the sentence of death on the defendant if the
jury or, if there is no jury, the court finds by a special verdict, as
provided in subsection (e), that at the time of the offense (1) the
defendant was under the age of eighteen years, or (2) the defendant
was a person with mental retardation, as defined in section 1- g, or (3)
the defendant's mental capacity was significantly impaired or the
defendant's ability to conform the defendant's conduct to the
requirements of law was significantly impaired but not so impaired in
either case as to constitute a defense to prosecution, or (4) the
defendant was criminally liable under sections 53a-8, 53a-9 and
53a-10 for the offense, which was committed by another, but the
defendant's participation in such offense was relatively minor, although
not so minor as to constitute a defense to prosecution, or (5) the
defendant could not reasonably have foreseen that the defendant's
conduct in the course of commission of the offense of which the
defendant was convicted would cause, or would create a grave risk of
causing, death to another person.' 90
Several states, however, have legislation pending that would
implement a death penalty exemption for severely mentally ill offenders.
Indiana presents an interesting case study. Indiana established a
commission, known as the Bowser Commission, to look at the
imposition of the death penalty on the mentally ill. The Bowser
Commission91 issued a report in November 2007 recommending the
exemption of the severely mentally ill from the death penalty. In accord
with this recommendation, Indiana, Senate Bill No. 22, introduced on
January 7, 2009, prohibits the imposition of the death penalty on an
individual judicially determined to have a severe mental illness. The bill
defines severe mental illness as one or more of the following mental
disorders: schizophrenia, schizoaffective disorder, bipolar disorder,
major depression, and delusional disorder. In connection with this
legislative development, there has been sympathetic media coverage of
Joseph Corcoran, a paranoid schizophrenic, who a jury sentenced to

190. CONN. GEN. STAT.
191.

§ 53a-46a (2010).

FINAL REPORT OF THE BOWSER COMMISSION (Nov. 2007).

Report, "the
Bowser had
particularly
retardation."

According to the Final

Bowser Commission was named in honor of the late Senator Anita Bowser. Senator
a long-time interest in studying whether the death penalty was suitable in any case, but
in cases when the defendants were afflicted with either mental illness or mental
Id. at 4.
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death for the murder of his brother, his sister's fianc6, and two other
men.19 2 At this time, the Indiana bill exempting the severely mentally ill
from the death penalty has been referred to the state Senate Committee
on the Judiciary.
North Carolina also has legislation pending that would seek to give
effect to the ABA recommendation to prohibit the imposition of the
death penalty on the severely mentally ill.' 93 The proposed legislation
provides: "[n]otwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, no
defendant who was under the influence of a severe mental disability at
the time of the commission of the criminal offense shall be sentenced to
death."' 94 The North Carolina bill defines severe mental illness as:
Any mental disability or defect that significantly impairs a person's
capacity to do any of the following: (i) appreciate the nature,
consequences, or wrongfulness of the person's conduct in the criminal
offense; (ii) exercise rational judgment in relation to the criminal
offense; or (iii) conform the person's conduct to the requirements of the
law in connection with the criminal offense. A mental disability
manifested primarily by repeated criminal conduct or attributable
solely to the acute effects of alcohol or other drugs does not, standing
alone, constitute a severe mental disability for purposes of this
section.195
The Tennessee commission' 96 studying the death penalty had,
among its tasks, the duty to determine "[w]hether the law provides
adequate protection for specific vulnerable populations such as the
mentally retarded . . . and the mentally ill; whether persons suffering

from mental illness constitute a disproportionate number of those on
death row and what criteria should be used in judging the level of mental
illness involved; and whether or not people with mental illness should be

192. Unjust Death Penalty, THE JOURNAL GAZETTE, Jan. 6, 2009, available at
Mr.
http://www.joumalgazette.net/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20090106/EDIT07/901060316.
Corcoran's case has been remanded by the U.S. Supreme Court to the Seventh Circuit for further
consideration of claims that the Seventh Circuit did not consider. Included among these claims is
Mr. Corcoran's challenge to the imposition of the death penalty on one who is mentally ill.
Corcoran v. Levenhagen, 130 S. Ct. 8 (2009). On remand, the Seventh Circuit vacated Mr.
Corcoran's death sentence based on unreasonable findings of fact by the Indiana Supreme Court.
Corcoran v. Levenhagen, 593 F.3d 547, 552 (7th Cir. 2010). The Circuit Court did not reach Mr.
Corcoran's Eighth Amendment claim that the execution of the mentally ill is prohibited because Mr.
Corcoran had not exhausted his state avenues for relief on this issue. Id. at 555.
193. Capital Procedure/Severe Mental Disability, S.B. 309, Gen. Assemb. (N.C. 2009).
194. S.B. 309, Gen. Assemb. (N.C. 2009).
195. Id. As of September 2010, the legislation in North Carolina is still pending.
196. For a discussion of the Tennessee Commission, see William Redick Is Tennessee Going
to Fix its Death Penalty?,45-SEP TENN. B.J. 12 (Sept. 2009).
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executed."l 9 7 Pennsylvania has legislation pending to investigate the
death penalty and to impose a moratorium on executions;198 the study
would include an examination of the types of protection provided to
vulnerable groups, including the mentally ill.' 99
All death penalty states allow a defendant to present mitigating
evidence of mental illness to the jury as a reason not to impose a
sentence of death.200 States also recognize that mental illness can, under
197. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-209(c)(3) (2009).
198. S.B. 1110, Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2009).
199. S.B. 1110 § 3(b)(7), Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2009).
200. For examples of statutory mitigating factors taking into account the offender's mental
state at the time of the commission of the crime, see ALA. CODE § 13A-5-51 (2010) ("capital
offense was committed while the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional
disturbance," "capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform
his conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired"); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §
13-751 (2010) ("defendant's capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform
his conduct to the requirements of law was significantly impaired, but not so impaired as to
constitute a defense to prosecution"); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-605 (1987) ("capital murder was
committed while the defendant was under extreme mental or emotional disturbance," "capital
murder was committed while the capacity of the defendant to appreciate the wrongfulness of his or
her conduct or to conform his or her conduct to the requirements of law was impaired as a result of
mental disease or defect"); CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3 (West 2010) ("[w]hether or not the offense
was committed while the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional
disturbance," ".[w]hetheror not at the time of the offense the capacity of the defendant to appreciate
the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was impaired as
a result of mental disease or defect"); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-1.3-1302 (West 2009)
("defendant's capacity to appreciate wrongfulness of the defendant's conduct or to conform the
defendant's conduct to the requirements of law was significantly impaired, but not so impaired as to
constitute a defense to prosecution," "emotional state of the defendant at the time the crime was
committed"); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11 § 4209 (2010) (not setting out specific statutory mitigating
factors, but allowing presentation of mitigating evidence); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141 (2010)
("capital felony was committed while the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or
emotional disturbance," "capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his or her
conduct or to conform his or her conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired");
GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-30 (2010) & State Court Rules Unified Appeal Report of Trial Judge (not
setting out specific statutory mitigating factors, but allowing presentation of mitigating evidence,
including defendant's mental state and ability to appreciate the wrongfulness of his acts); IDAHO
CODE ANN. § 19-2515 (2010) (not setting out specific statutory mitigating factors, but allowing
presentation of mitigating evidence); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/9-1 (2010) ("murder was
committed while the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance,
although not such as to constitute a defense to prosecution," "defendant suffers from a reduced
mental capacity"); IND. CODE § 35-50-2-9 (2010) ("defendant was under the influence of extreme
mental or emotional disturbance when the murder was committed," "defendant's capacity to
appreciate the criminality of the defendant's conduct or to conform that conduct to the requirements
of law was substantially impaired as a result of mental disease or defect"); KAN. STAT. ANN. §
21-4626 (2009) ("crime was committed while the defendant was under the influence of extreme
mental or emotional disturbances, "capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of the
defendant's conduct or to conform the defendant's conduct to the requirements of law was
substantially impaired," "[a]the time of the crime, the defendant was suffering from post-traumatic
stress syndrome caused by violence or abuse by the victim"); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.025
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(LexisNexis 2010) ("capital offense was committed while the defendant was under the influence of
extreme mental or emotional disturbance even though the influence of extreme mental or emotional
disturbance is not sufficient to constitute a defense to the crime," "[a]t the time of the capital
offense, the capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct to the
requirements of law was impaired as a result of mental illness or retardation or intoxication even
though the impairment of the capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct
or to conform the conduct to the requirements of law is insufficient to constitute a defense to the
crime"); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 905.5 (2010) ("offense was committed while the offender was
under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance," "[a]t the time of the offense the
capacity of the offender to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the
requirements of law was impaired as a result of mental disease or defect"); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM.
LAW, § 2-303 (LexisNexis 2010) ("murder was committed while the capacity of the defendant to
appreciate the criminality of the defendant's conduct or to conform that conduct to the requirements
of law was substantially impaired due to emotional disturbance, mental disorder, or mental
incapacity"); Miss. CODE ANN. § 99-19-101 (1972) ("offense was committed while the defendant
was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance," "capacity of the defendant to
appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was
substantially impaired"); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 565.032 (West 2010) ("murder ... committed while the
defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance, "capacity of the
defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements
of law was substantially impaired"); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-304 (2010) ("offense was
committed while the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional
disturbance," "capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of the defendant's conduct or
to conform the defendant's conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired"); NEB.
REV. STAT. § 29-2523 (2010) ("crime was committed while the offender was under the influence of
extreme mental or emotional disturbance," "[a]t the time of the crime, the capacity of the defendant
to appreciate the wrongfulness of his or her conduct or to conform his or her conduct to the
requirements of law was impaired as a result of mental illness"); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 200.035
(LexisNexis 2010) ("murder was committed while the defendant was under the influence of extreme
mental or emotional disturbance"); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630:5 (2010) ("defendant's capacity to
appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law
was significantly impaired, regardless of whether the capacity was so impaired as to constitute a
defense to the charge," "defendant committed the offense under severe mental or emotional
disturbance"); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15A-2000 (West 2010) ("capital felony was committed
while the defendant was under the influence of mental or emotional disturbance," "capacity of the
defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements
of law was impaired"); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.04 (2010) ("[w]hether, at the time of
committing the offense, the offender, because of a mental disease or defect, lacked substantial
capacity to appreciate the criminality of the offender's conduct or to conform the offender's conduct
to the requirements of the law"); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21 § 701.7 (2010) (not setting out specific
statutory mitigating factors, but allowing presentation of mitigating evidence); OR. REV. STAT. §
163.150 (2009) ("extent of the mental and emotional pressure under which the defendant was acting
at the time the offense was committed"); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711 (2010) (statutory
mitigating factors include " defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional
disturbance" and "capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to
conform his conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired"); S.C. CODE ANN. §
16-3-20 (2009) ("murder was committed while the defendant was under the influence of mental or
emotional disturbance," "capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to
conform his conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired," "mentality of the
defendant at the time of the crime"); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-27A-2 (2010) (not setting out
specific statutory mitigating factors, but allowing presentation of mitigating evidence); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 39-13-204 (2010) ("murder was committed while the defendant was under the influence of
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certain circumstances, relieve the defendant of criminal liability
altogether although the person may be committed to a mental health
facility for an extended period.
Although the Court in Roper and Atkins tended to focus on state
legislative action, state court decisions and state court action interpreting
state constitutional provisions also seem highly relevant to the evolution
of standards of decency. States can express policy and constitutional
principles through judicial action and interpretation of state
constitutional doctrine as well as through state legislative action. 20 1 It is
worth noting then that some state court judges have expressed significant
doubts about the constitutionality of executing the severely mentally ill,
although these views are expressed in dissenting or non-controlling
202
opinions.
For example, in his dissent in Corcoran v. State,203 Justice Rucker
of the Indiana Supreme Court expressed the view that a sentence of

extreme mental or emotional disturbance," "capacity of the defendant to appreciate the
wrongfulness of the defendant's conduct or to conform the defendants conduct to the requirements
of the law was substantially impaired as a result of mental disease or defect or intoxication, which
was insufficient to establish a defense to the crime but which substantially affected the defendant's
judgment"); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071 (2009) (jury "shall consider all evidence
admitted at the guilt or innocence stage and the punishment stage, including evidence of the
defendant's background or character or the circumstances of the offense that militates for or
mitigates against the imposition of the death penalty"); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-207 (LexisNexis
2010) ("homicide was committed while the defendant was under the influence of mental or
emotional disturbance," "at the time of the homicide, the capacity of the defendant to appreciate the
wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirement of law was impaired as a
result of a mental condition"); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.4 (2010) ("capital felony was committed
while the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance," "at the
time of the commission of the capital felony, the capacity of the defendant to appreciate the
criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was significantly
impaired"); WASH. REV. CODE § 10.95.070 (2010) ("[w]hether the murder was committed while the
defendant was under the influence of extreme mental disturbance," "[w]hether, at the time of the
murder, the capacity of the defendant to appreciate the wrongfulness of his or her conduct or to
conform his or her conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired as a result of
mental disease or defect"); WYo. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-102 (2010) ("murder was committed while the
defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance," "capacity of the
defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements
of law was substantially impaired").
201. For a discussion of the use of state constitutions to advance individual liberty and
protection, see William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutionsand the Protection of Individual Rights,
90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 502 (1977).
202. See Corcoran v. State, 774 N.E.2d 495, 502 (Ind.2002) (Rucker, J., dissenting); State v.
Nelson, 173 N.J. 417, 803 A.2d 1, 41 (2002) (Zazzali, J., concurring); State v. Scott, 92 Ohio St.3d
1, 748 N.E.2d 11, 19-20 (2001) (Pfeifer, J., dissenting).
203. 774 N.E.2d 495, 503 (Ind.2002) (Rucker, J., dissenting). See Jon Laramore, Indiana
Constitutional Developments: Evolution on Individual Rights, 42 INDIANA L. REV. 909, 930-

201l]

THE CHALLENGE AND DILEMMA

569

death for a person suffering from severe mental illness violates Article I,
§ 18 of the Indiana Constitution, which provides that "[c]ruel and
unusual punishments shall not be inflicted. All penalties shall be
proportioned to the nature of the offense." In Overstreet v. State,204
Justice Rucker noted that "a state is free as a matter of its own
constitutional law to confer rights above the floor of constitutional
safeguards found in the United States Constitution," 205 and stated his
belief that the Indiana Constitution provides greater protection than the
federal constitution.206 Justice Rucker then opined:
In this case, precedent from the United States Supreme Court, albeit in
a slightly different context, informs my view on the question of
whether certain mentally ill prisoners should be excluded from
execution. In Atkins v. Virginia, the Court held that executions of the
mentally retarded violated the Eighth Amendment. Importantly the
Court declared that the basis for this prohibition is the mentally
retarded person's "diminished capacities to understand and process
information, to communicate, to abstract from mistakes and leam from
experience, to engage in logical reasoning, to control impulses, and to
understand the reactions of others." Of course, Indiana's statutory
prohibition on executing the mentally retarded predates Atkins by eight
years. And there is no claim in this case that Overstreet is mentally
retarded. But the logic and underlying rationale of Atkins applies with
equal force here. That is to say, if a person who is mentally ill suffers
from the same "diminished capacities" as a person who is mentally
retarded, then logic dictates it would be equally offensive to the
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment to execute that
mentally ill person.

Punishment is cruel and unusual under Article I, Section 16 if it
"makes no measurable contribution to acceptable goals of punishment,
but rather constitutes only purposeless and needless imposition of pain
and suffering." Because I see no principled distinction between the
diminished capacities exhibited by Overstreet and the diminished
capacities that exempt the mentally retarded from execution, I would
declare that executing Overstreet constitutes purposeless and needless
imposition of pain and suffering thereby violating the Cruel and
31(2009) (discussing Overstreet and Justice Rucker's separate views with respect to mentally ill
capital offenders).
204. 877 N.E.2d 144 (Ind. 2007).
205. Id. at 175 (citing PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980); Cooper v.
California, 386 U.S. 58, 62 (1967)).
206. Overstreet, 877 N.E.2d at 175.
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Unusual Punishment provision of the Indiana Constitution. Therefore,
I would remand this cause to the post-conviction court with
instructions to impose a sentence of life imprisonment without
parole.207
It is interesting that Justice Boehm, another Indiana justice,
observed in his dissent in Baird v. State208 that, with respect to Ford
hearings and determinations of insanity, courts need "to exercise
extreme caution in executing a person whose mental health is plainly
questionable unless we can be certain the person does not meet the Ford
standard, much less another more restrictive standard that may now
apply in light of Atkins and Roper."209 Justice Boehm emphasized the
difficulties in making a Ford determination, particularly given Atkins'
attention to "the longstanding doctrine that the severity of the
punishment must be correlated to the culpability of the defendant."2 10
In his dissenting opinion in State v. Scott, Supreme Court of Ohio
Justice Pfeiffer stated: "[t]his court could declare that in the interests of
protecting human dignity, Section 9, Article I of the Ohio Constitution
prohibits the execution of a convict with a severe mental illness. I
believe that the 'evolving standards of decency that mark the progress
of' Ohio call for such a judicial declaration." 211 Similarly, in her
concurring opinion in State v. Ketterer,2 12 Ohio Supreme Court Justice
Evelyn Lundberg Stratton stated that courts should reconsider the
imposition of the death penalty on someone suffering from severe
mental illness, particularly in light of polls showing diminished public
support for the execution of mentally ill prisoners, 2 13 and the ABA
recommendation to exempt the mentally ill. 2 14 While expressing her
personal view "that the time has come for our society to add persons
with severe mental illness to the category of those excluded from
application of the death penalty, I believe that the line should be drawn
by the General Assembly, not by a court."2 15 Justice Stratton then stated

207. Id. at 175 (footnote and citations omitted).
208. 833 N.E.2d 28 (Ind. 2005).
209. Id. at 35 (Boehm, J., dissenting).
210. Id
211. 92 Ohio St.3d 1, 748 N.E.2d 11, 20 (2001).
212. 111 Ohio St.3d 70, 2006-Ohio-5283, 855 N.E.2d 48, at
224-50 (Stratton, J.,
concurring).
213. Ketterer, Ill Ohio St.3d at 1232 (citing Kevin Drew, Arkansas Prepares to Execute
Mentally
Ill
Inmate,
CNN.COM,
Jan.
5,
2004,
at
http://www.cnn.com/2004/LAW/01/05/singleton.death.row/ index.html).
214. Ketterer, Ill Ohio St.3dat 233-36.
215. Id. at 1248.
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that she would "urge our General Assembly to consider legislation
setting the criteria for determining when a person with a severe mental
illness should be excluded from the penalty of death." 2 16
Despite the views of individual state court justices, no state court
has extended the Atkins and Roper rationale to severe mental illness.
Indeed, a substantial number of state courts have expressly refused to
extend these constitutional principles to mental illness and continue to
find that the imposition of the death penalty on a mentally ill offender is
constitutional. For example, in State v. Hancock,217 the Ohio Supreme
Court observed that no court had extended Atkins to mental illness and it
specifically refused to do so, rejecting the claim that mental illness is
comparable in terms of blameworthiness to mental retardation. In Reese
v. State,2 18 the Florida Supreme Court declined to equate mental illness
or severe emotional disturbance at time of the offense with mental

216. Id.
217. 108 Ohio St.3d 57, 2006-Ohio-160, 840 N.E.2d 1032, at 1156-158; see also State v.
Lawson, slip copy, 2008 WL 4964319, *8 (Ohio App. 12 Dist., Nov. 24, 2008); State v. Johnson,
207 S.W.3d 24, 50-51 (Mo. 2006) (refusing to find death penalty disproportionate when imposed on
an individual with mental illness and declining to extend Atkins to capital defendants with mental
illness); Johnson v. Com., No. 2006-SC-000548-MR, 2008 WL 4270731, *6 (Ky. Sept. 18, 2008)
(unpublished) (finding defendant "has made absolutely no showing that a national consensus in this
country, with a consistency of the direction of change against such executions, has arisen against
executions of those with mental illness. Johnson's mental illness has not been demonstrated to be a
reason to prohibit his execution"); Sprouse v. State, No. AP-74933, 2007 WL 283152, *8 (Tex.
Crim. App. Jan. 31, 2007) (unpublished) (declining to extend Atkins to mental illness).
218. 14 So.3d 913, 920 (Fla. 2009); see also Nixon v. State, 2 So.3d 137 (Fla. 2009)
(reaffirming no constitutional death penalty exemption based on mental illness at time of offense);
Lawrence v. State, 969 So.2d 294, 300, n.9 (Fla. 2007) (rejecting assertion that Equal Protection
Clause requires an extension of Atkins to include mental illness); Diaz v. State, 945 So.2d 1136,
1151 (Fla. 2006) (finding "neither this Court nor the Supreme Court has recognized mental illness
as a per se bar to execution"). In Carroll v. Crosby, No. 6:05-cv-857-Orl-31KRS, 2008 WL
2557555, *18-19 (M.D.Fla. June 20, 2008) (unpublished), the federal district court for the Middle
District of Florida stated:
Despite persuasive arguments and strong expert opinions in support of its application,
the extension of Atkins to the mentally ill could prove to be difficult to implement.
Unlike mental retardation, mental illness is not as "technically" defined and
"scientifically" diagnosed. It is a broad and ambiguous term that can encompass a wide
array of mental disorders. Thus, it could be difficult to know where to draw the line.
Furthermore, there is no consensus in state legislation supporting a categorical exclusion
for the mentally ill. Perhaps someday, law and medical science will develop to a point
where mental illness is recognized as providing an exemption from the death penalty.
But that is not the state of the law at this time, and Atkins cannot be read to support
Petitioner's position. Accordingly, since the Florida court's decision was reasonable in
light of federal law, Petitioner's claim must be denied.
Id. at *18-19.
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retardation or to extend Atkins to mental illness. In Lewis v. State,2 19 the
Georgia Supreme Court declined to extend Atkins to mental illness and
found no support for the claim that the execution of severely mentally ill
prisoners violates the Eighth Amendment.
In Commonwealth v.
Baumhammers,22 0 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court declined to craft a
severe mental illness exemption in light of Atkins. Likewise, lower
federal courts in habeas review have declined to extend Atkins and
Roper to severely mentally ill capital defendants. 22 1
Even though no state court has found a blanket exemption for the
severely mentally ill, state courts often find that a defendant's mental
illness may warrant a finding that the death penalty is disproportionate
as applied in a particular case. For example, in State v. Thompson,2 22 the
Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals found the death penalty a
disproportionate punishment where the defendant, who had murdered his
wife, had a lengthy and well-documented history of mental illness
throughout his adult life and no significant criminal history. In Haynes
v. State,223 the Nevada Supreme Court found the death penalty
disproportionate when imposed on a mentally ill man who was likely
delusional at the time he committed the murder for which he had been
sentenced to death. In Cooper v. State,224 the Florida Supreme Court

219. 279 Ga. 756, 620 S.E.2d 778, 786 (2005). See also Hall v. Brannan, 284 Ga. 716, 670
S.E.2d 87, 96-97 (2008) ("as an independent, alternative holding, we conclude that, unlike the case
of juvenile offenders and mentally retarded persons, there is no consensus discernible in the nation
or in Georgia sufficient to show that evolving standards of decency require a constitutional ban,
under either the Constitution of the United States or under the Georgia Constitution, on executing
all persons with mental illnesses, particularly persons who have shown only the sort of mental
health evidence that Brannan has shown").
220. 599 Pa. 1, 960 A.2d 59, 96-97 (2008), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 104 (2009).
221. In re Neville, 440 F.3d 220, 221 (5th Cir. 2006) (noting that Atkins and Roper did not
create a new rule of constitutional law protecting the severely mentally ill from the death penalty);
Franklin v. Bradshaw, slip copy, 2009 WL 649581, *74 (S.D.Ohio Mar. 9, 2009) (unpublished)
(finding extending Atkins to severe mental illness is outside a federal court's habeas authority); Alba
v. Quarterman, 621 F.Supp. 2d 396, 430 (E.D.Tex. 2008) (finding state court refusal to extend
Atkins to severe mental illness was not an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent and
also was consistent with 5th Circuit precedent); Green v. Quarterman, No. H-07-827, 2008 WL
442356, *7 (S.D.Tex. Feb. 15, 2008) (finding that the federal court lacks authority in habeas review
to extend Atkins to mental illness).
222. No. E2005-01790-CCA-R3-DD, 2007 WL 1217233, *36 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 25,
2007) (unreported, currently on appeal to the Tennessee Supreme Court).
223. 103 Nev. 309, 739 P.2d 497, 503-04 (1987).
224. 739 So.2d 82, 86 (Fla. 1999). See also Crook v. State, 908 So.2d 350 (Fla. 2005) (finding
death penalty disproportionate for twenty-year-old offender with mental deficiencies including
organic brain damage); Larkins v. State, 739 So.2d 90, 95 (Fla. 1999) ("The killing here appears to
be similar to the killing that occurred in Livingston and to have resulted from impulsive actions of a
man with a history of mental illness who was easily disturbed by outside forces."); Offord v. State,
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found the death sentence disproportionate in the case of an eighteenyear-old man with no prior criminal record who had been diagnosed
with brain damage, borderline mental retardation, and paranoid
22
schizophrenia. In State v. Roque,225
the Arizona Supreme Court found a
death sentence disproportionate based on the defendant's mental illness
and low intellectual capacity.
While the preceding cases and discussions suggest that the use of
mental illness as a mitigating factor protects the mentally ill, in reality
juries frequently impose death sentences on the severely mentally ill and
appellate courts regularly uphold those sentences. For example, in State
v. Johnson,22 6 the Missouri Supreme Court refused to find the death
penalty disproportionate when imposed on an individual with mental
illness and specifically declined to extend Atkins to mentally ill capital
defendants. In Dennis v. State,22 7 the Utah Supreme Court refused to
find the death penalty excessive in light of the deliberateness of the
mentally ill defendant's crime. In Rodgers v. State,228 the Florida
Supreme Court upheld a death sentence in a case where the defendant,
who had an extensive history of mental illness, pleaded guilty, waived
mitigation, and sought the death penalty. The Florida court found the
death penalty appropriate because the two aggravating factors
outweighed the mitigating factors. Likewise, the Arizona Supreme
Court in State v. Boggs2 29 found that mitigating evidence of the
defendant's poor mental health and difficult upbringing did not warrant
leniency given the lack of causal connection between the defendant's
poor mental health and his crime.
So where does this leave the legislative and state judicial
consideration of mental illness and the death penalty? All states prohibit
the execution of someone who is so mentally ill that he is deemed insane
at the time of execution. While this legislative status is relevant, it is not
959 So.2d 187, 193 (Fla. 2007) (finding death sentence disproportionate where there was only one
aggravating factor and defendant had lifelong, well-established history of severe mental illness).
225. 213 Ariz. 193, 141 P.3d 368, 405-06 (2006).
226. 207 S.W.3d 24,50-51 (Mo. 2006).
227. 13 P.2d 434, 440-42 (Nev. 2000).
228. 3 So.3d 1127 (Fla. 2009). See also Gill v. State, 14 So.3d 946, 964-65 (Fla. 2009) (death
penalty not disproportionate despite defendant's history of mental health problems given
"magnitude of [ ] aggravating factors"); Hauser v. State, 701 So.2d 329 (Fla. 1997) (finding death
penalty not disproportionate where defendant pleaded guilty and asked lawyers not to present
mitigating evidence where three aggravating factors outweighed mitigating evidence including long
history of mental health problems); Davis v. State, 2 So.3d 952, 965-66 (Fla. 2008) (finding death
sentence not disproportionate despite evidence of defendant's brain damage and chronic mental
illness).
229. 218 Ariz. 325, 185 P.3d 111, 130 (2008).
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precisely on point, and it is unclear how far the Court would extend this
analogy. All states provide that mental illness can be introduced as
mitigating evidence.230 However, in Penry and Stanford, the Court
refused to find that the mitigating evidence of youth and mental
retardation, in and of itself, amounted to a constitutional prohibition on
execution due to these characteristics or conditions. The ABA and other
noteworthy professional organizations recommend a death penalty
exemption for the mentally ill.231' Although relevant and important to the
development of an exemption, an ABA recommendation is usually not
considered persuasive, on its own, by the Supreme Court. Some state
appellate justices are raising significant state constitutional concerns
about the imposition of the death penalty on the severely mentally ill,
which may offer further evidence of a consensus prohibiting the
execution of these individuals. However, these views have not yet
garnered a majority on any state court to protect the severely mentally ill
on state constitutional grounds.2 32
Unfortunately, the evidence that seemed of critical concern to the
Court in Akins and Roper was that eighteen death penalty states
expressly banned the execution of mentally retarded and juvenile
offenders, respectively. These eighteen states, plus the then-twelve nondeath penalty states, provided the Court with sufficient evidence to show
a national consensus that the imposition of the death penalty violated the
Eighth Amendment. This number, eighteen death penalty states, is
consistent with the Court's requirement of state legislative consensus in
Thompson and Stanford. With respect to showing a national consensus
to exempt the severely mentally ill, there are now three more non-death
penalty states, but specific mental illness legislative exemptions in death
penalty states do not look as significant as they did in Roper and Atkins.
Only one state explicitly bans the execution of the mentally ill, although
legislation is pending in other states. The status of explicit legislative
exemption is not comparable to the legislative statutes present in Roper
or Atkins, which may prove a significant stumbling block in efforts to
achieve a constitutional exemption.
These observations are not meant to underplay the legislative,
judicial, and social action being taken on behalf of the severely mentally
ill in the death penalty context. They show, however, that what seemed
to drive the Court's jurisprudence in Atkins and Roper was not, or at

230. See supra note 200.
231. Seesupra note 6& pp. 558-60.
232. See supra pp. 468-73
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least was not simply, the compelling arguments of culpability,
retribution, and deterrence, which the Court stressed as the constitutional
underpinnings of the death penalty. Rather, a significant part of what
drove the Court to change its earlier position with respect to mentally
retarded and juvenile offenders was the emergence of eighteen death
penalty states statutorily protecting these individuals. To the extent that
the Supreme Court is looking for state statutes explicitly prohibiting the
death penalty on the severely mentally ill, there is not as direct or
explicit legislative protection for the mentally ill as there was for
mentally retarded offenders in 2002, or juvenile offenders in 2005.233
The current status of state legislation is more analogous to Penry than
Atkins. As discussed earlier, the Court in Penry did not find the
legislative record sufficient to show a consensus that there was an
evolving standard of decency protecting mentally retarded offenders
from the death penalty.234 Again, this observation is not intended to
discount the powerful analogy between the defendants protected in
Atkins and severely mentally ill defendants. 23 5 Rather taken together
these observations are intended as a frank assessment of the Court's
record of construing the Eighth Amendment and a realistic assessment of
the task at hand in crafting an exemption for the severely mentally ill.
The fact that few states provide explicit exemptions for the severely
mentally ill means that advocates for these individuals must engage in
the messy, slow process of state-by-state protection for this class of
capital defendants. Steps are underway in a few states, and these efforts
need to continue and expand. Advocates should also look at state
constitutions for protection of the severely mentally ill and use state
constitutions to seek state court protection for these offenders. Based on
the Court's track record on crafting death penalty exemptions for classes
of individuals, going back to state legislatures and enacting state
legislative exemptions remains a critical step in building a national
consensus to protect the severely mentally ill.
The Supreme Court has not yet agreed to hear an exemption
challenge for the seriously mentally ill. On October 5, 2009, the
Supreme Court denied certiorari review in Baumhammers v.
Pennsylvania,23 6 which involved the petition of Richard Scott
Baumhammers, a former lawyer suffering from a delusional disorder of

233.
234.
235.
236.

See suprapp. 561-63.
See suprapp. 551-62.
See suprapp. 555-61.
130 S. Ct. 104 (2009).
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persecutory or paranoid schizophrenia,23 7 who awaits execution in
Pennsylvania. In his certiorari petition to the U.S. Supreme Court,
Baumhammers argued, inter alia, that in light of Atkins, the imposition
of the death penalty on someone suffering from mental illness violates
the Eighth Amendment.238 The Court declined to address the issue or
hear Baumhammers' case.239
VI. CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND EIGHTH AMENDMENT
EVOLUTION: REALISTIC ASSESSMENTS, PRAGMATIC SUGGESTIONS,
AND MEANINGFUL METHODS TO GIVE EFFECT TO THE PROMISE OF
ATKINS, ROPER, AND PANETTI

The Court's decision to not hear Baumhammers leaves open the
opportunity to build a better record in the state legislatures before the
Court acts on this issue, which, given the Court's approach to Eighth
Amendment exemptions in other cases, appears a wise step to take in
crafting a successful argument for the recognition of an exemption for
the severely mentally ill. As noted at the outset, for better or for worse,
the dance of death penalty law is more than simply the substance or
merits of the constitutional claim or argument. Seeking constitutional
protection from an inappropriate or unwarranted death sentence imposed
on a mentally ill offender also requires advocates to consider and plan
for arguments addressing how the Court discerns and develops its Eighth
The Eighth Amendment's "evolving
Amendment jurisprudence.
standard of decency that marks the progress of a maturing society"
standard explicitly invites this element of process into the substantive
discussion of the meaning of cruel and unusual punishment. 240 The
Court's recognition that the Eighth Amendment's protection evolves and
grows more protective as society moves to a more humane system of
justice means that there must be some system, or process, or measure of
this evolution. Accordingly, the Court must have some method for
seeing or determining how that evolution occurs.
Counting state statutes stood front and center in both Atkins and
Roper, and this counting is consistent with other post-Gregg death
penalty decisions. Recognizing this element of Eighth Amendment
analysis is critical to providing a full-bodied, successful constitutional

237. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Baunhammers v. Pennsylvania, No. 08-1455 (May 25,
2009), 2009 WL 1486859.
238. Id. at *27-33.
239. Baumhammers, 130 S. Ct. at 104.
240. Lain, supra note 37, at 10.
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argument for severely mentally ill capital defendants. In this regard, it is
important to keep in mind the relationship between the democratic
process and the development of the Eighth Amendment as well as the
Court's concerns that its processes not step too far outside public
sentiments.241 In discussing a process of constitutional construction that
has been referred to as democratic constitutionalism, 242 Professors
Robert Post and Reva Siegel observe:
The premise of democratic constitutionalism is that the authority of the
Constitution depends on its democratic legitimacy, upon the
Constitution's ability to inspire Americans to recognize it as their
Constitution. This belief is sustained by traditions of popular
engagement that authorize citizens to make claims about the
Constitution's meaning and to oppose their government-through
constitutional lawmaking, electoral politics, and the institutions of civil
society-when they believe that it is not respecting the Constitution.
Government officials, in turn, both resist and respond to these citizen
claims. These complex patterns of exchange have historically shaped
the meaning of our Constitution.243
While recognizing the special role of courts to declare and enforce
rights and to constrain government, Professors Post and Siegel posit that
"judicial authority to enforce the Constitution, like the authority of all
government officials, ultimately depends on the confidence of citizens.
If courts interpret the Constitution in terms that diverge from the deeply
held convictions of the American people, Americans will find ways to
communicate their objections and resist judicial judgments." 2 4
Reflecting these concerns, commentators have observed that when the
Court leaps out too far ahead of legislative actions or diverges too far
from the practices of the democratic institutions, there is often a loud,
public rebuke of the Court. 24 5 Arguably, when the Court overturned all
death penalty statutes in Furman, it suffered a public rebuke by the

241. Hills, Jr., supranote 131; Lain, supranote 37.
242. See GOODWIN LIU, PAMELA KARLAN & CHRISTOPHER SCHROEDER, KEEPING FAITH WITH
THE CONSTITUTION (American Constitution Society for Law and Policy 2009); John W. Whitehead
& John Beckett, A DysfunctionalSupreme Court: Remedies and a ComparativeAnalysis. 4 CHARL.
L. REv. 171, 186 (2009) (describing democratic constitutionalism); IT Is A CONSTITUTION WE ARE
EXPOUNDING: COLLECTED WRITINGS ON INTERPRETING OUR FOUNDING DOCUMENT, (American
Constitution Society for Law and Policy 2009) [hereinafter IT ISA CONSTITUTION].
243. Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and Backlash, 42
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 373, 374 (2007). See also Liu et al., supra note 242; Whitehead &
Beckett, supra note 242; IT Is A CONSTITUTION, supra note 242.
244. Post & Siegel, supranote 243.
245. Hills, Jr., supra, note 131, at 22-24; Lain, supra,note 37, at 46-55.
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states that reworked and reestablished death penalty statutes.246 The
death penalty regime set out in Gregg and its companion cases arguably
fell more in line with state legislative action.247
Taking into account these concerns, an argument can be made that
courts should look to what is happening in the nation's democratic
institutions and let that guide the shape that the Constitution is to take in
the future.24 8 In this way, it is arguably appropriate and even preferred
to allow the process of protecting the severely mentally ill to work its
way through state democratic systems just as the exemptions for the
mentally retarded and juvenile offenders worked their way through the
state legislative processes. And indeed, this approach seems to be the
post-Gregg model that the Court has relied upon in construing the scope
of the Eighth Amendment's protection in the area of capital
punishment.24 9
But when courts cleave too closely to states as a guide for the
meaning of the Eighth Amendment, the results may prove
Consider Justice
constitutionally unsatisfying and unworkable.
Blackmun who, after consistently voting to uphold capital punishment
statutes during most of his career, despaired at the end over the
constitutional inadequacies of the modern death penalty system. 25 0 The
246. Hills, Jr., supra, note 131, at 22-24; Lain, supra, note 37, at 46-55.
247. Hills, Jr., supra,note 131, at 22-24; Lain, supra, note 37, at 55-64.
248. See Post & Siegel, supranote 243. See also Liu et al., supra note 242.
249. Justice Souter in his dissent in District Attorney's Office for Third Judicial Dist. v.
Osborne, 129 S. Ct. 2308, 2340 (2009) (Souter, J., dissenting), noted this concern in the context of
the development of substantive due process rights. Justice Souter opined:
As for determining the right moment for a court to decide whether substantive due
process requires recognition of an individual right unsanctioned by tradition (or the
invalidation of traditional law), I certainly agree with the Court that the beginning of
wisdom is to go slow. Substantive due process expresses the conception that the liberty it
protects is a freedom from arbitrary government action, from restraints lacking any
reasonable justification, and a substantive due process claim requires attention to two
closely related elements that call for great care on the part of a court. It is crucial, first,
to be clear about whose understanding it is that is being taken as the touchstone of what
is arbitrary and outside the sphere of reasonable judgment. And it is just as essential to
recognize how much time society needs in order to work through a given issue before it
makes sense to ask whether a law or practice on the subject is beyond the pale of
reasonable choice, and subject to being struck down as violating due process.
It goes without saying that the conception of the reasonable looks to the prevailing
understanding of the broad society, not to individual notions that a judge may entertain
for himself alone, and in applying a national constitution the society of reference is the
nation. On specific issues, widely shared understandings within the national society can
change as interests claimed under the rubric of liberty evolve into recognition, or are
recast in light of experience and accumulated knowledge.
Id. at 2340-41.
250. Seesuprap.541.
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more modest efforts of Gregg and modem death penalty constitutional
law, which followed and deferred more to state legislative action, failed,
in Justice Blackmun's view, to meet the constitutional objectives and
obligations of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause. 251 Likewise,
the ALI abandoned its efforts to craft or revise a model death penalty
statute because the system is not workable.252 If the ALI cannot craft a
model statute, can the Court comfortably rely on state statutory action as
the lead guide in Eighth Amendment death penalty limits?
With respect to severely mentally ill defendants, a slow,
incremental, cautious approach that counts states in order to discern the
evolving standards of decency that guide the Eighth Amendment will
undoubtedly mean that states will kill severely mentally ill prisoners
while an exemption inches its way through legislatures across the
country. In other words, an individual, who is not sufficiently culpable
to be punished by death when viewed in comparison with other
protected groups, will be executed under the counting regime to which
the Court adheres. While it is undoubtedly critical for the Court to be
sufficiently deferential to the democratic branches and the legislative
process, there are limits to waiting for the states to act. To risk stating
the obvious, would relying on such an approach to constitutional
construction have allowed a 1950s Supreme Court to bring a
constitutional end to the entrenched segregationist practices of the Deep
South? 253
Moreover, a rigid approach to counting states does not seem to be a
particularly principled way to interpret such important constitutional
254
The pattern of Eighth Amendment cases suggests, if not
protection.
expressly at least implicitly, that there must be eighteen death penalty
states, or thirty death penalty and non-death penalty states combined,
before a certain class of defendants is constitutionally protected from
execution that would otherwise be disproportionate.255 This method
seems an odd way for constitutional protection to evolve. While perhaps
connected to the consensus of the states, this aspect of discerning the
meaning of the Eighth Amendment does not appear particularly
connected to the stated constitutional goal of tying the death penalty to
251. See Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1143-44 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissent from denial
of certiorari).
252. See suprapp. 542-43.
253. Laurence Tribe, Foreword,in IT Is A CONSTITUTION WE ARE EXPOUNDING: COLLECTED
WRITINGS ON INTERPRETING OUR FOUNDING DOCUMENT (American Constitution Society for Law
and Policy 2009).

254. Hills, Jr., supra note 132.
255. See suprapp. 551-55, 562-63.

580

AKHON LAW REVIEW

[44:529

culpability. Further, relying on state legislative action does not
necessarily insulate the Court from public rebuke or attack when it
interprets the Eighth Amendment. For example, some of the public
response to Roper, which focused on the reference in the opinion to the
international community in the opinion, was quite strident in its criticism
of the Court.
Despite the criticisms and shortcomings of the "counting" method
of constitutional construction, the reality is that counting is part of the
game. Thus, when advocates for the mentally ill marshal their
arguments, they must deal with this aspect of capital punishment law.
Acceptance of this aspect of the Eighth Amendment, however, does not
mean that the advocates for severely mentally ill offenders must accept
defeat. For example, advocates could assert that in the last eight years,
the Court has broadened the Eighth Amendment's standard of decency
by recognizing that the Eighth Amendment precludes the imposition of
the death penalty on any individual who, due to a medically established
mental condition, is less culpable or at least possesses no greater
culpability than juveniles or mentally retarded offenders. Looking at the
Eighth Amendment from a broader principle of culpability that
correlates to a defendant's documented medical condition would provide
an argument that the consensus already exists to protect the severely
mentally ill whose culpability is no greater than that of the mentally
retarded or juvenile offender. In support of this argument, advocates can
urge that even in the absence of eighteen death penalty states explicitly
exempting the mentally ill from the death penalty, multiple state actions
show a national consensus protecting the severely mentally ill: (1) states
giving effect to the constitutional prohibition on executing juveniles and
mentally retarded offenders indicate state recognition that certain
characteristics-that are also associated with severe mental illnessmust limit the death penalty; (2) statutes prohibiting the execution of
"insane" prisoners illustrate the universal revulsion generated by
executing individuals who lack a rational understanding of their
circumstances; (3) statutes providing that mental illness is a mitigating
factor demonstrate the strong societal view that mental illness is a reason
not to impose the death penalty; (4) current trend of state statutory
restrictions or prohibitions on the use of the death penalty is evidence of
a general movement away from the death penalty; (5) in addition to
Connecticut's statutory exemption for the severely mentally ill, other
state legislatures are in the process of crafting statutory protection for
this group of capital offenders; (6) state justices have raised concerns
about the execution of the mentally ill based on provisions in state
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constitutions; and (7) the actions of the ABA and ALI demonstrate
major legal organizations' significant concerns about the continued use
of the death penalty in general and as applied to mentally ill offenders.
Although this argument may be appealing, in the end, it will
probably not prevail. Rather, it is very likely that the Court will look at
the severely mentally ill as a category or class of offenders that is
separate and distinct from juvenile or mentally retarded offenders and
that is seeking a separate and unique exemption from the death penalty.
If the Court deals with the severely mentally ill as falling within a new
or wholly separate category of Eighth Amendment exemptions, then the
Court may only be willing to count those statutes and legislative actions
bearing directly on the mentally ill. If the Court analyzes this exemption
in isolation, then the precedents of Atkins and Roper may be probative,
but not determinative, and the legislative record for this exemption at
this time is probably not sufficient for the Court to find that a consensus
exempting the severely mentally ill. Instead, as discussed earlier, efforts
to establish recognition for a death penalty exemption for the severely
mentally ill will require the additional hard work of crafting specific
state exemptions for the mentally ill, such as is currently underway in
Indiana and North Carolina.
VII. CONCLUSION

In light of the Court's past practices, including its holdings and
analysis in Atkins and Roper, it seems likely that the Court will look at
and demand separate state legislative exemptions explicitly protecting
the severely mentally ill who, at the time of the commission of their
crime, lacked the requisite culpability to have the death penalty imposed
upon them. Since the reinstatement of the death penalty in Gregg, the
Court appears to avoid the use of broad protections and broad challenges
to the death penalty. Rather the Court inches forward, and often
backward, on the constitutional scope of the death penalty in America on
a case-by-case basis requiring states to take the lead on any systemic
change to the modem death penalty regime. My reluctant conclusion is
that the Court is going to engage in an isolated, narrow approach to
constitutional construction on this issue, and while Atkins and Roper
may be useful, they will not be determinative. Moreover, to look at this
issue as only about the constitutional exemption and not about the
process by which the constitutional exemption becomes a reality is to
misread the Court.
Such an approach would underestimate the
frustrating realities of modern death penalty jurisprudence and would
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cause advocates to miss an essential component of a successful
constitutional challenge.
Thus, from a pragmatic-albeit disappointing-point of view, the
future of the constitutional death penalty exemption for the severely
mentally ill is as dependent on the state legislative process as it is on the
Court. While recognizing the compelling analogies between the
severely mentally ill and other vulnerable groups exempt from the death
penalty, as well as the influential positions of the ABA, the ALI and
other professional organizations representing the mentally ill, at this
point in time, the Court is going to look to state legislatures, and what
happens in those legislative bodies, in my view, is likely to be
determinative of the future of this exemption from the death penalty.

